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nearly 30, 000 corporatelaw data points, Ifind that despite globalization pressures, these corporate laws have diverged over time. I alsofind that the common provisions amongjurisdictions appearlargely to be limited to less significant enabling (non-mandatory)rules, which may further structuraldiversity.
The finding of divergence between the corporate laws of Japan and the
United States is especially interestinggiven the similar economic status of the
countries, their extensive interaction, and similar corporate and securities law
starting points that evolution-toward-efficiency and path-dependence theories
suggest would foster similarpatterns of statutory development. This Article attempts to identify precisely which institutions lead to such divergence. Through
an archeologicalstudy of the development of Japanese corporate law, I argue
that a likely explanationfor this divergence is the tendency of the Japanese system to rely on exogenous shocks to stimulate statutory change. A substantial
explanationfor Japan's reliance on exogenous shocks lies in Japan's institutions-particularly in those institutions that lack jurisdictional competition
and contemplate a limited role for lawyers. Continued institutionaldifferences
suggest persistent corporate law divergence despite globalizationpressures.
INTRODUCTION

For some researchers, the dream experiment is the study of identical twins separated at birth and raised in dramatically different environments. If the twins turn out similarly, nature may be more important than nurture. If they turn out differently, nurture may be the
more dominant force.
The results of a similar experiment for corporate law could be fascinating. Imagine if a researcher could "raise" a corporate law system
from infancy in two different institutional settings. Fifty years later,
the researcher could check the development of the systems to determine whether corporate law is, as Robert Clark puts it in a slightly different legal context, "determined by a set of genes fixed in its infancy"
or responds instead "to the shifting pressures of a changing environment.'' Through such a study, we might gain a better understanding
of one of the central debates in corporate law today: whether globalization is leading to the convergence of corporate law and governance
systems, or whether national and systemic differences will result in
Robert Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter
C. An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 90 (1977) [hereinafter Clark, Subchapter C]. See generally Robert C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238,
1239 (1981) [hereinafter Clark, LegalEvolution] (arguing for the interdisciplinary study
of legal evolution whereby scholars "formulate and test explanations of... general
trends of [legal] change").
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continued diversity.
This Article identifies and conducts such a corporate law experiment. Due to a series of historical quirks, the Japanese Commercial
Code and the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (the "MBCA"),
on which most state corporate statutes are based,2 are both based on
the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1933, a statute often described
3
as the first "modem" United States corporate code. I compare the
development of these three corporate law sources by examining a
hand-collected historical database of nearly 30,000 observations covering the period from 1950 to 2000. This database, which uses the
MBCA as a baseline due to its widespread adoption and standardized
use in previous studies, is the most comprehensive one assembled to
date for investigating corporate law convergence. Through an analysis of these data, this Article presents and attempts to explain a corporate and comparative law puzzle of what factors influence statutory
development. Although I rely particularly on the U.S.-Japan comparison for explanations, the separated-at-birth quirk suggests more widely
applicable conclusions.
Three additional reasons make Japan a particularly good candidate for comparative analysis in this context. First, Japan is the
world's second largest economy and perhaps the single most economically significant corporate law jurisdiction in the world. Second,
the Japanese system has a relatively public revision process, and to the
extent that its details are private, prominent participants in the revision process often reveal them, either in published memoirs or in interviews that I conducted from 1998 to 2000. Finally, although a considerable literature has developed regarding the political economy of
4
various Japanese corporate governance institutions, and although

See William J. Carney, The Production of CorporateLaw, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715, 743
(1998) [hereinafter Carney, CorporateLaw] ("Twenty-two states have adopted new corporate statutes based on the Revised Model [Business Corporation] Act between 1985
and 1996.").
3 See, e.g., William H. Painter, Introduction: Symposium on the 1983 Illinois Business
CorporationAct, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 635, 635 (describing the Illinois Business Corporation Law as "a landmark statute and forerunner of the Model Business Corporation
Act").
4 See, e.g.,
Ronald J. Gilson & MarkJ. Roe, Understandingthe Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 875
(1993) (discussing the managerial monitoring and producing functions of the Japanese keiretsu's cross-ownership structure); Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation
in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance
Debate, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 865, 868 (1997) (exploring "the linkage between corporate
governance and innovation by examining the institutional environment for venture
2

530

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 150: 527

some of those studies place particular reliance on general principles
of Japanese corporate law,5 there is virtually no literature in English
that focuses on Japanese corporate law as a body of law. This gap in
the literature fuels a common misperception among many academics
that law in Japan is unimportant. Due at least in part to this misperception, the bulk of scholarship on the important questions of comparative corporate governance and international jurisdictional competition has proceeded with little knowledge-and a largely
superficial discussion-of the corporate law that governs the affairs of
many of the world's largest and most powerful corporations.7 This Article attempts to narrow that gap while telling-for the first time-the
8
archaeological story of the evolution ofJapanese corporate law.
Although some scholars have argued that corporate law on the
books is unimportant,' a detailed analysis of corporate law develop-

capital in the United States and Japan"). See generally Mark Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany,Japan,and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993) (examining the differences in corporate structure among German, Japanese, and American
financial institutions).
5 See, e.g., Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Relational Theory of Japanese
Corporate Governance:
Contract, Culture, and the Rule of Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 3, 3-5 (1996) (highlighting the
role of law in Japanese corporate governance mechanisms); Andrew H. Thorson &
Frank Siegfanz, The 1997 Deregulation of Japan's Holding Companies, 8 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'vJ. 261, 261 (1999) (exploring the "historic legal, political, and economic significance" of Japan's deregulation of holding companies in 1997); Mark D. West, The Pricing of ShareholderDerivativeActions in Japan and the United States, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1436,
1441 (1994) [hereinafter West, Derivative Actions] (arguing that economics, not culture, plays the primary role in Japanese decision making regarding whether to pursue
litigation in the context of shareholder derivative actions).
See Milhaupt, supra note 5, at 8 ("Since most observers have focused on the absence of legal controls in Japan, law remains underconceptualized and largely static in
much of the existing literature .... ).
7 Moreover, the lack of study of Japanese corporate
law leads to further misconceptions. A recent article, for instance, claims that "United States corporate law has
never traveled anywhere, save perhaps Ontario, where an earlier version of the Modern Business Corporation Act influenced the Canadian provincial legislation." Douglas M. Branson, Teaching Comparative Corporate Governance: The Significance of "Soft Law"
and InternationalInstitutions,34 GA. L. REV. 669, 682 (2000).
8 While the Japanese literature contains
little discussion on the evolution of Japanese corporate law, two recent symposia celebrating the 100th anniversary of the Japanese Commercial Code addressed various revisions. See generally 7okusht, Sh~h6
lOOnen: Sono Kiseki to 21 Seiki e no Tenb6 [Special Issue: The 100th Anniversary of the Commercial Code: The Code and Developments into the 21st Century], 1155 JURISUTO 5-15
(1999); Tokushil, Sh5h6 lOOnen [Special Issue: One Hundred Years of Corporate Law],
H6RITSUJI6,June 1999.
9 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 3 (1991) ("[W]hat is open to free choice is far more
important to the daily operation of the firm, and to investors' welfare, than what the
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ment may nevertheless yield important insights. There seems to be
emerging a general consensus, based largely on recent empirical studies by financial economists, that corporate law plays an important role
in the development of corporate governance structures, as suggested
by the close correlation between capital market success and legal system characteristics.'0 The triviality thesis also may not apply at all to
developing economies," a label that applies to much of the history of
Japan discussed herein. Recent empirical work further suggests that
corporate law can add value even in developed economies, 2 and law
in a civil regime such as Japan may play a more important, less "trivial"
role.
Moreover, proponents of the triviality thesis have yet to articulate
a theory of corporate law that encompasses the subject of this Article:
change. If corporate law does not matter, why does it change? A response that focuses on interest groups and political economy merely
raises a further question: Why has so much energy been expended
over so many years in an effort to change that which is merely trivial?
Without a theory that accounts for corporate law change, the phenomena discussed in this Article may present a greater challenge to
the triviality thesis than the triviality thesis presents to the subject of
this Article.
My argument has three primary components. First, this Article

law prescribes."); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990) (developing a "triviality hypothesis that, appearances not withstanding, state corporate law is trivial [in that] it does not prevent
companies .. from establishing any set of rules of governance they want").
o See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World,
54 J. FIN.
471, 511 (1999) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership] ("[E]quity markets
are both broader and more valuable in countries with good legal protection of minority shareholders."); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113,
1114 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Law and Finance] ("The differences in legal
protections of investors might help explain why firms are financed and owned so differently in different countries."); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External
Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1149 (1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al., External Finance]
("[T]he legal environment-as described by both legal rules and their enforcementmatters for the size and extent of a country's capital markets."); see also Jeffrey N.
Gordon, The ShapingForce of Corporate Law in the New Economic Order, 31 U. RICH. L. REv.
1473, 1474 (1997) ("[C]orporate law, and the associated corporate governance regime, is a very important variable in determining economic performance.").
I1 See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman,
A Self-Enforcing Model of CorporateLaw,
109 HARv. L. REv. 1911, 1914 (1996) (recognizing that in emerging economies, where
other legal, market, and cultural constraints are absent, corporate law is "a much more
central tool for motivating managers and large shareholders to create social value").
12 See, e.g., Robert Daines, Does Delaware
Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON.
525 (2001) (presenting evidence that Delaware corporate law improves firm value).
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adds empirical evidence to the comparative corporate governance debate by showing that despite a growing literature on the convergence
of corporate law and governance structures, the corporate law regimes of Japan and the United States appear to have diverged, not
converged, over time. Divergence is an especially interesting discovery in this context, as it appears to have occurred despite the similarities between the two largest economies in the world, despite the high
level of interaction between the countries, and despite similar corporate and securities regulation 4 starting points-at least as of 1950that might be expected to foster path-dependent constraints.
Although Japan and the United States of course have differing
institutional structures, if there is one place that theory would predict
statutory convergence, this might be it.
Convergence has not
occurred, however. In fact, the evidence tentatively suggests that to
the limited extent that common provisions exist, the provisions are
not mandatory rules but enabling rules, which may lead to even
further diversity in corporate structures. The limited convergence of
1. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Pathways to Corporate Governance?:
Two Steps on the
Road to ShareholderCapitalism in Germany, 5 COLUM.J. EUR. L. 219, 219 (1999) (discussing the cross-border acquisition as a convergence route that will become increasingly
influential); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (arguing that "[d]espite very real differences in the
corporate systems [among European, American, and Japanese companies], the deeper
tendency is toward convergence, as it has been since the nineteenth century"). But cf
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & MarkJ. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership
and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 127 (1999) ("Our theory of path dependence
sheds light on why the advanced economies, despite pressures to converge, vary in
their ownership structures. It also provides a basis for why some important differences
might persist."); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 213, 213 (1999) ("This Article advances the view that neither global
convergence that eliminates systemic differences nor the emergence of a hybrid best
practice safely can be projected because each national governance system is a system to
a significant extent."); CurtisJ. Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1145,
1148 (1998) (using a property rights analysis to argue that despite "increasing globalization of capital and product markets.., the convergence of national corporate governance systems will be slow, sporadic, and uncertain"). See generally Andrei Shleifer &
Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52J. FIN. 737, 737 (1997) (comparing corporate governance in several different countries "with special attention to the
importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world"); Ronald J. Mann & Curtis J. Milhaupt,
Forewordto E Hodge O'Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium: Path Dependence and
Comparative Corporate Governance, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 317, 320 (1996) ("This symposium
issue.., focuses the application of path dependence to corporate institutions on a
natural topic: comparative corporate governance.").
14 For a discussion on the U.S. origins ofJapanese
securities regulation, see Curtis
J. Milhaupt, Managing the Market: The Ministry of inance and Securities Regulation injapan, 30 STAN.J. IN1'L L. 423, 430 (1994).
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corporate structures. The limited convergence of such diversityfacilitating rules helps elucidate recent claims in the theoretical literamay not necessarily lead to converture that convergence of rules
5
structures.
corporate
of
gence
Second, one observable phenomenon that fits the divergence data
is the reliance of the Japanese system on exogenous shocks. Establishing a bright line between the endogenous and the exogenous is difficult.1 6 In this Article, I use "exogenous" to refer to such factors as
scandal, international competition, and foreign pressure, each of
which is not directly internally generated. Japan relies on each of
these factors to jump-start its legal development. By contrast, changes
in U.S. corporate legal regimes tend to result from a combination of
stimuli. Some U.S. stimuli are exogenous, such as scandal and reaction to judicial decisions. Others are endogenous, such as interest
group pressures and state competition for charters, neither of which
necessarily requires the 'jump-start" of exogenous shock. Changes
enacted in direct response to exogenous stimuli tend to occur on different corporate law provisions than those enacted in response to endogenous factors. The reliance on exogenous stimuli and the.exclusion of other factors that may influence policy may thus lead to
different patterns of corporate law development (but not necessarily
fewer corporate law modifications) despite similar starting points and
also suggests continued divergence despite increasing internationalization pressures.
Third and finally, I find that a-potential explanation for the differing degrees to which U.S. and Japanese corporate legal regimes rely
on exogenous shocks can be found in the institutions that create regulatory competition among jurisdictions. Systems in which the state
creates a monopoly for corporate charters are more likely than internally competitive regimes to rely on external shocks to jump-start legal
development. The reliance is further increased in Japan by policymaking institutions that tend to discourage, or at least do little to encourage, endogenous change, particularly those that limit lawyer participation in the decision-making process. Thus, while some readers
may cast theory aside and predict divergence based on institutional
differences between the United States and Japan, one additional conSee e.g., Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 13, at 138 (arguing that corporate rules do
not necessarily facilitate convergence because they "are themselves influenced by the
economy's initial pattern of corporate structures").
16 Over time, the reliance on exogenous shocks
may in effect become endogenized, thereby ,making a bright-line definition difficult.
15
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tribution of this Article is a clear determination of which institutional
differences matter and to what degree.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I briefly discuss the existing debate over convergence in corporate law and governance. In
Part II, I examine the historical database to set forth the divergencecentered puzzle of corporate law development in Japan, Illinois, and
the MBCA. In Part III, I discuss the historical development of the
Japanese Commercial Code to show that the divergence can be explained, at least in part, by Japan's reliance on exogenous shocks to
produce legal change. In Part IV, I tell an institutional story of corporate law development to explain the reliance on exogenous shocks.
Part V discusses implications for the comparative corporate law and
governance debate and the role of foreign legal advisors in corporate
law development.
I.

THE CONVERGENCE DEBATE

Two of the central debates of corporate law in recent years have
been about the convergence or divergence of corporate governance
systems and of corporate law itself. The underlying debate is nothing
new to comparative law scholars. John Merryman's near-classic article
on the convergence and divergence of civil and common law systems,
in which he discussed the "growing trend toward formal international
economic, social and political integration" as a convergence force and
suggested that convergence is more powerful than divergence, appeared in 1978 and cites a litany of historical predecessors. 7 But for
comparative corporate law, which had traditionally been a descriptive
exercise and the domain of corporate law scholars, apparent forces of
globalization in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in a "new" genre of literature.
A quick glance at some of the recent leading articles in the field
shows that consensus remains elusive on even the most fundamental
issues. Ronald Gilson, for instance, states that "the most we can predict is substantial variation both across and within different national
systems." " John Coffee argues that some form of convergence will be

17John H. Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law
and the
Common Law, in NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR A COMMON LAw OF EUROPE 195, 202 (Mauro
Cappelletti ed., 1978).
8 RONALDJ. GILSON, GLOBALIZING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:

CONVERGENCE OF

FORM OR FUNCTION 34 (Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 174,
2000), available at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract-id=229517.
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facilitated through one form or another of worldwide securities regulations or standards. 9 Lucian Bebchuk and Mark Roe argue that path
dependence makes structural convergence unlikely, and that even if
corporate law (hypothetically) converges, corporate governance may
not. 20

Curtis Milhaupt contends that the presence of property rights

21
institutions make structural convergence unlikely. At the opposite
end of the spectrum, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman write
22
that convergence of "most of corporate law" has already occurred .
A major cause of the lack of consensus is the lack of empirical evidence. Anecdotal evidence to support convergence theories abounds.
In recent years, the shrinking of physical distances through advances
in communication at least suggests more frequent cross-border inter21
action and opportunities for borrowing, if not convergence. Yet persistent observable differences remain. Given the number and diversity
of corporate law systems around the world, it should not be too diffi4
cult to find anecdotal evidence to support either theory.
As a matter of fact, empirical work has recently appeared. In a series of jointly authored articles, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanos, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny found differences among
systems in ownership concentration, capital market development, vot5
ing rights, and external finance. But these broad "legal family" cross-

19John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospectsfor Global Convergence in

Corporate Governance and Its Implications,93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 650 (1999).
20 Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 13, at 129; see also Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All
Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-CulturalTheory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 147, 201 (2001) (arguing that despite globalization trends, "national cultures will not be fully supplanted by a single global culture even for global players").
21 See Milhaupt, supra note 13, at 1148 ("[E]ven assuming the existence of both an
optimal corporate governance system and exogenous forces that would inspire homogenizing changes in existing national patterns of industrial organization, the convergence of national corporate governance systems will be slow, sporadic, and uncertain.").
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 439.
23 See generally ALAN WATSON,
LEGAL TRANSPLANTS:
AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATM LAW 95-101 (1974) (outlining ways in which law gets transplanted across
borders).
24 For the most empirical evidence on the issue of convergence of corporate law,
see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 440. The dominance of the shareholderoriented model in the United States, Europe, and Japan, they argue, results in especially strong legal convergence in the areas of board structure, disclosure and capital
market regulation, shareholder suits, takeovers, and judicial discretion in those jurisdictions. Their claims concerning those areas of law are intriguing, but their general
descriptive comparisons of the relevant laws do not purport to substitute for rigorous
empirical analysis.
r,See generally sources cited supra note 10 (detailing differences among corporate
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country studies, while interesting, do not examine provisions of corporate law in detail, and, as John Coffee has noted, they may overstate
both the differences between civil and common law systems and the
similarities among systems in each category. 26
Other recent work avoids many of these difficulties. William Carney's excellent study of the adoption of European Community directives examines corporate law provisions in some detail.27 But because
that study does not track changes over time, it offers little insight into
the convergence question. Katharina Pistor examines the development of corporate law provisions over time using a modified version
of the variables used by La Porta and others, but still examines relatively broad themes over a relatively short period of time.28 To better
understand the legal convergence issue, a more detailed study of
statutory development over time is required.
Before discussing my study, a caveat is in order. Like most of the
above studies, I am concerned principally with corporate law and governance rules. This focus ignores other areas of law that affect corporations, such as rules regarding banking, labor, tax, commercial transactions, bankruptcy, antitrust, and securities. I ignore these areas not
because I think that the study would not offer important insights, but
largely because tracking the changes in all of these disparate areas of
law would be virtually impossible. Ijustify the exclusion by noting that
most of these areas of law, at least, share a similar Americaninfluenced history in Japan.29

legal regimes worldwide).
26 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization
and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from
Securities Market Failure,25J. CORP. L. 1 (1999) (noting especially the heterogeneity of
common law systems); see also Robert D. Cooter & Tom Ginsburg, ComparativeJudicial
Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic Models, 16 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 295, 300
(1996) (reporting survey results that place some common law courts below some civil
law courts in terms of 'judicial daring").
27 William J. Carney, The PoliticalEconomy
of Competition for Corporate Charters,26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 303, 318 (1997) [hereinafter Carney, PoliticalEconomy]. Carney's excellent work on domestic corporate law production, which focuses primarily on the political economy in a single system, also differs from this comparative study of corporate
law development in differing national systems over time. Carney, Corporate Law, supra
note 2, at 716-17.
28 Katharina Pistor, Patterns of Legal Change:
Shareholderand CreditorRights in Transition Economies, I EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REv. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Pistor, Patterns];see
KATHARINA PISTOR ET AL., LAW AND FINANCE IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 6-13 (Harvard
Univ. Ctr. for Int'l Dev., Working Paper No. 49, 2000) (examining both laws "on the
books" and law "in action" in transition economies and concluding that the latter has a
greater impact) .
29 See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory
of Corporate Law and Corporate
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Besides these substantive areas of law, I also do not discuss extensively such broader factors as enforcement, procedural rules, legal
30
customs, and social norms. In some areas, such as self-regulating institutional structures,' Japan is roughly equal to the United States; in
others, such as ownership dispersion, differences are more obvious.
Similar or not, these areas potentially could be important. If, for instance, the cross-shareholding and keiretsu systems in Japan limit the
incentives of shareholders to assert various remedies, the law on the
books may indeed be trivial. But these issues, which have been debated for years, lack easy solutions, especially without a clear picture
of corporate law development as a guide.
My claims are more limited, and my methods more simplistic.
The tools and methods that I use are not designed to measure systemic convergence, or even some measure of "overall" legal convergence, but simply convergence of corporate law rules. If my limited
agenda has an advantage, it is that separating law into its several components and focusing squarely on codes within the institutional structure helps clarify developments in that area so that they may be better
understood when reset into the broader context.

Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1325, 1342 (1998) (arguing that in Japan, the United
States, and Germany, the development of corporate governance and corporate bankruptv institutions is complementary).
See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, CorporateLaw and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1253, 1257-61 (1999) (defining the importance of social norms in corporate governance); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Non-Legal Rules in
Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2083 (2001) (analyzing the origins, persistence, and current evolution of a series of nonlegal rules (norms) in Japanese corponate governance); Zenichi Shishido, Problems of the Closely Held Corporation: A
ComparativeStudy of the Japanese and American Legal Systems and a Critique of the Japanese
Tentative Draft on Close Corporations,38 AM. J. COMP. L. 337, 341 (1990) (discussing enforcement mechanisms and procedural flexibility in American andJapanese law).
31 See Mark D. West, Private Orderingat the World's First Futures Exchange, 98 MICH.
L.
REV. 2574, 2574 (2000) (discussing self-regulating institutional structures); cf JOHN C.
COFFEE, JR., CONVERGENCE AND ITS CRrncs: WHAT ARE THE PRECONDITIONS TO THE
SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL? (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law and

Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 179, 2000) (arguing that the common law advantage in creating self-regulating systems leads to widely dispersed ownership).
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II. A PUZZLE

A.

The Common StartingPoint ofJapaneseand U.S. Law

Only fifteen years after the first published description of the corporate form appeared inJapanese,32 the Japanese government in 1881
commissioned German legal scholar Hermann Roesler to attempt a
first draft of a commercial code. The code that resulted from Roesler's efforts, which was promulgated in 1899, was based largely on
the German code and is said to have drastically altered customary
business practices. 3
The 1899 legal structure remained basically intact until its revision
by the officials (known as "SCAP" for Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers or "GHQ" for General Headquarters) of the U.S. occupation ofJapan following World War II (the "Occupation"). SCAP officials saw a need for great change in Japan's commercial and financial structure. They believed that shareholding should be widely
dispersed, corporate governance should be democratic, and the wartime zaibatsu3 4 conglomerates should be dissolved and their executives
purged. Although a number of tactics could have been used to ac32YUKICHI FUKUZAWA, SEIYO JIJ6 [CONDITIONS OF THE
WEST] (Okadaya Kishichi
1958) (1866); see Azumi Ann Takata, From Merchant House to Corporation: The Development of the Modern Corporate Form and the Transformation of Business Organization in Japan, 1853-1912, at 185-192 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Stanford University) (on file with Stanford University Library).
33 See Roppo ZENSHO, Law No. 48 of 1899 (applying
the Code to all parties to any

act which is a commercial act as to any one of the parties). The Code was revised in
1911, 1933, and 1938, but consistently retained its German flavor as well as its relatively
anti-shareholder stance. See Makoto Yazawa, The Legal Structurefor CorporateEnterprise:
Shareholder-Management Relations Under Japanese Law, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL
ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 547, 547 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed., 1963) ("The
Commercial Code was transplanted from Germany to Japan in 1899 ....Subsequent
amendments to the code in 1911, 1933, and 1938... continued to reflect German develo ments.").
"Industries which had been acquired or initially developed by
the Government
were sold, at very low sums, to favored individuals or firms. These favored few were
further aided and protected through a series of wars. The firms which in this fashion
rose to predominance became known as the Zaibatsu." Michiko Ariga & Luvern V.
Rieke, The Antimonopoly Law of Japan and Its Enforcement, 39 WASH. L. REv. 437, 437
(1964).
35 See, e.g., ELEANOR M. HADLEY, ANTITRUST INJAPAN
61 (1970) ("The Allied policy
[was] to dissolve the combines and remove the zaibatsu families ....); Ariga & Rieke,
supra note 34, at 438 (pointing out that in light of the close connection between the
zaibatsuand the wartime Japanese government, "it is not surprising that the occupation
powers regarded the zaibatsuas a structure of unique importance to military aggression
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complish these goals, the Occupation reformers had a New-Dealnuanced vision of democracy that "relie [d] on law as a vehicle to ef3
fect social and political change." " The bulk of the legal work of the
Occupation was assigned to the SCAP Legal Section, but the task of
creating a revised Antimonopoly Law fell to the Anti-Trust and Cartels
Division of the Economic and Scientific Section. The job was assigned
to the then American attorney with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice Judge Posey T. Kime, and American lawyer Lester
AntimonopSalwin,3 who created drafts of what became the 4Japanese
0
in 1948.41
Law
3
Association
Trade
the
and
oly Law 9 in 1947
These tasks completed, the Anti-Trust Division in 1949 turned its
attention to a related body of law not yet appropriated by the Legal
Section for examination: the Commercial Code. The task fell specifically to Lester Salwin and newcomer Irving Eisenstein. Both, coincidentally, were sons of German-Jewish immigrants, 1931 graduates of
43
the University of Illinois, and trial lawyers from Chicago. In fact, of
which they felt must be dissolved in the interests of world peace"); Alex Y. Seita & Jiro
Tamura, The HistoricalBackground ofJapan'sAntimonopoly Law, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 115,
147 (discussing how Occupation forces "directed the democratization of industry
through the deconcentration of economic power").
John 0. Haley, Consensual Governance: A Study of Law, Culture, and the Political
Economy of Postwar Japan, in 3 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN: CULTURAL AND
SOCIAL DYNAMICs 32, 38 (Shumpei Kumon & Henry Rosovsky eds., 1992); see also
THEODORE COHEN, REMAKINGJAPAN: THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION AS NEW DEAL 32-48
(1987) (describing the influence of New Deal ideology on Occupation policies);
HITOSHI MISON6, NIHON NO DOKUSEN KINSHI SEISAKU TO SANGYO SOSHIKI [JAPANESE
ANTIMONOPOLY POLICY AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION] 10-11 (1987) (same).
37 ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIEDJAPAN 220-21 (1976).
38 Harry First, Antitrust in Japan: The OriginalIntent, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL'YJ. 1, 3544 (2000); Seita & Tamura, supra note 35, at 168-69 & n.345.
39 Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi to K~sei Torihiki no Kakuho ni Kansuru Hritsu
[Antimonopoly Law], Law No. 54 of 1947.
40 Jigy6sha Dantai H6 [The Trade Association Law], Law No. 191 of 1948.
41 The year 1948 also brought a minor Commercial Code revision that deleted
provisions permitting the issuance of partially paid shares. See Law No. 148 of 1948,
art. 176 ("A person who has subscribed for shares shall incur an obligation to effect
payment in accordance with the number of shares allotted to him by the promoters.").
42 See Thomas L. Blakemore & Makoto Yazawa, Japanese Commercial Code Revisions
Concerning Corporations,2 AM. J. COMP. L. 12, 14 (1953) (describing this change in focus by Allied authorities). The Division received assistance from the Legal Section,
particularly from Thomas Blakemore and Kurt Steiner. See, e.g., Lester Salwin, Note
for File (Mar. 21, 1941) National Diet Library, Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, NDL ESS(E) 06792; Kurt Steiner, Note for File (Mar. 26, 1949) National
Diet Library, Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, NDL LS 10304 [hereinafter cited as "NDL [microfiche number]"].
43 Letter from Marjorie Salwin, Daughter of Lester Salwin, to Mark D. West (Feb.
3, 1999); Telephone Interview with Marjorie Salwin, Daughter of Lester Salwin (Jan.
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the five members of the Division who worked on the Commercial
Code, three (Salwin, Eisenstein, and First Lieutenant Robert W. Hudson) were Illinois lawyers. 44
Of the three attorneys from Illinois, Lester Salwin (1911-1984) was
the clear leader. Salwin was an experienced litigator 5 a prolific
scholar, 46 a dedicated public servant, 47 and, as a contemporary from
the Anti-Trust Division told me more than fifty years after her introduction to Salwin, "[hie was a peppery sort of character., 48 Apparently Salwin was known for his tendency to "pound the table" and was
said to be "dramatic and authoritarian;" not much happened until
Salwin arrived. 9
Salwin began the Commercial Code revision process with his "Six
Points Memo" of January 25, 1949. The main six points5" address (1)

18, 1999); see also Irving Eisenstein, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 14, 1992, at 68 (discussing
Eisenstein); Kenan Heise, Lawyer Irving Eisenstein, 82, Worked for U.S. in FarEast, CHI.
TRJB., May 16, 1992, at C19 (same); Telephone Interview with Norman Eisenstein,
Brother of Irving Eisenstein (Feb. 5, 1999) (same).
44 See Masafumi Nakahigashi, Sengo Sh6h5
no Saishuppatsu [The PostwarRestarting of
the Commercial Code], H6RITSUJIH6, June 1999, at 28, 29 (describing how and to what
extent Illinois law was implanted in the Japanese Commercial Code).
45 See, e.g., Gold-Form, Inc. v. Bowles, 152
F.2d 107 (Emer. Ct. App. 1945) (Salwinlitigated protest against an Emergency Price Control Act provision); Mevorah v.
Bowles, 151 F.2d 766 (Emer. Ct. App. 1945) (Salwin-litigated arbitrary and capricious
claim against Price Administrator); DeMotte v. DeMotte, 4 N.E.2d 960 (I11.1936) (Salwin-litigated divorce and contempt action).
46 See, e.g., Lester N. Salwin, Japanese
Anti-Trust Legislation, 32 MINN. L. REV. 588,
588 (1948) (providing an overview of the history and provisions of the 1947 Japanese
Antimonopoly Law); Lester N. Salwin, The New Commercial Code of Japan: Symbol of
GradualProgress Toward Democratic Goals, 50 GEO. L.J. 478, 512 (1962) [hereinafter Salwin, Commercial Code] (discussing the longevity of the Code reforms in relation to the
need for the "gradual democratization of virtually every aspect of Japanese Society");
Lester N. Salwin, Uncertain Nationality Status of German Refugees, 30 MINN. L. REV. 372,
377 (1946) (discussing the American Abrogation Law No. I and how it affects nationality status of refugees who emigrated from Germany). Salwin also authored case notes
and comments on various subjects in 21 ILL. B.J. 41 (1933) (trusts); 22 ILL. B.J. 22
(1933) (tax); 27 U. ILL. L. REV. 308 (1932) (contracts); 27 U. ILL. L. REV. 228 (1932)
(antitrust).
47 At various times, Salwin was employed by
the Social Security Administration, the
Department of Justice, the Smaller War Plant Corporation, the Office of the Alien
Property Custodian, the Office of Price Administration, the Small Business Administration, the American Embassy in Japan, and, of course, SCAP. Telephone Interview with
Marjorie Salwin, supra note 43.
Telephone Interview with Eleanor M. Hadley, Attorney, Anti-Trust Division of
the Department ofJustice (Feb. 7, 1999).
49 Id.
50 Despite the nomenclature, the memo actually
contained sixteen points, as well
as a separate section on foreign corporations. TAKEo SuzuKi, SH6H6 TO TOMO NI
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stockholders' right to access books and records, (2) transferability of
shares, (3) voting rights (including voting trusts, voting lists, proxies,
and classes of shares), (4) protection against dilution, (5) minority
stockholders' rights and remedies (including ultra vires acts, obligations of officers and directors, auditors, stock acquisitions, mergers
and consolidations, "court actions re[garding] wrongful acts"), and
(6) foreign corporations. 5'
The memo led to the establishment, in June 1949, of the first Legislative Council commissioned to study pending laws. In August of the
2
same year, the Council created a Commercial Law Subcommittee,
which included five judges, six lawyers, fourteen bureaucrats, ten law
professors (three from the University of Tokyo), and five industry
leaders. 53 A lengthy series of negotiations followed between the SubAYUMU [WALKING WITH COMMERCIAL LAw] 615-16 (1977). Japanese experts were surprised by the Six Points Memo. As Takeo Suzuki, the leading Japanese figure in the
revision process, put it, "The request from GHQ for revision came just as we expected,
but it included provisions on strengthening the role of and elevating shareholders beyond anything we had imagined.... If these requests became reality, wouldn't they
simply be used by troublemakers?" Id. at 162.
51 This document, as well as many other important documents in the revision process, are reprinted in MASAFUMI NAKAHIGASHI, SHOH6 KAISEI SH6WA 25/SHOWA 26GHQ/SCAP BUNSH6 [1950-1951 COMMERCIAL CODE REVISIONS: THE GHQ/SCAP
DOCUMENTS] 16-17 (1999). Special thanks to Masa Nakahigashi for providing early
drafts of this book.
52 The Subcommittee was chaired by Kenzo Takayanagi, a constitutional scholar
who had studied with Wigmore. See, e.g., KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR'S JAPANESE
CONSTITUTION:

A LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL STUDY OF ITS MAKING 178-80 (1991)

(providing Takayanagi's vision ofJapan as a nation in which all Japanese people would
be advisors to the Emperor); Kenzo Takayanagi, Some Reminiscences of Japan's Commission on the Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION OFJAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTYYEARS, 194767, at 71, 72 (Dan Fenno Henderson ed., 1968) (describing how Takayanagi became a
member, and later Chairman, of the Commission). Takayanagi had been instrumental, however, as the draftsman of the prewar Code. See I CODES TRANSLATION
COMMITTEE, THE COMMERCIAL CODE OFJAPAN ANNOTATED, at iv-vii (1931) (describing

Takayanagi's role as the draftsman).

ss SUZUKI, supra note 50, at 628-29. Despite the importance of the revisions, there
was little glamour for the participants in the revising process. Meetings were held at
Akasaka Palace in Tokyo three times weekly, each lasting at least half a day and often
continuing into the night. Id. at 157-58. One Japanese participant recalls bringing his
food from home and spending the entire time in a room in a Ueno temple. 3
CHUSHAKU KAISHAHO [ANNOTATED COMPANY LAW] 1, 3 (Tadao Omori ed., 1967)

(statement in introduction by Omori). Another remembers difficulty finding a hotel
room (many were either destroyed in the war or occupied by SCAP personnel), and
deciding upon lodging at the same temple. KEN'ICHIRO OSUMI, SH6JIH6 60NEN:
WATAKUSHI GA AYUNDA MICHI [60 YEARS OF COMMERCIAL LAW: THE PATH I WALKED]

152 (1988). Still another remarks that although the furnishings were nice, the air
conditioning did not work, the air was stifling, and he "had real problems with long
meetings because [he was] allergic to cigarette smoke." SEIJI TANAKA, SH6HO TO TOMO
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committee and SCAP officials.54
It is difficult to say what the Commercial Code might have looked
like without the Illinois attorneys (Salwin, Eisenstein, and Hudson),
who relied heavily on Illinois law in the reform process. As a "helpful
guide," Salwin began by furnishing the Japanese representatives with
"citations to the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1947"
on each of
the main points of the Six Points Memo:" Salwin's subsequent drafts
relied heavily on Illinois law.
The use of Illinois law as a model has not been attributed by SCAP
Legal Section contemporaries to the excellence of the legislation of
that state but highlights the simple fact "that the particular SCAP officials in charge of revision hailed from Chicago."5 In 1956, another
observer noted that the Japanese adoption of the Antimonopoly Law
was caused by the fact that "[s] ome dominant officer of the occupying
57
forces was apparently familiar with and addicted to the Illinois law.
But the use of Illinois law as precedent appears to have been more
than personal prerogative. The 1933 Illinois Business Corporation

NI RoKUJfINEN [60 YEARS WITH COMMERCIAL LAw] 322 (1982).
54 Eisenstein's handwritten notes show that

the meeting held on July 11, 1949, at
which it was decided that there would be "no more Commercial Code meetings unless
we call for them," was the fifty-ninth such meeting. NDL ESS(C) 09679. The actual
meetings between U.S. and Japanese representatives "were of a character unknown to
Roberts Rules of Order." Blakemore & Yazawa, supra note 42, at 14. Regulations for
the Council Amending the Commercial Code existed. See Regulations for the Council
Amending the Commercial Code (Feb. 3, 1949) NDL ESS(C)06793. Apparently, however, the regulations were of little import. See Masafumi Nakahigashi, GHQ Aite no
Kent5 no Seika [The Fruits of the Battle with GHQ], in NIHON KAISHA RIPP6 NO
REKISHITEK TENKAI [THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE CORPORATE
LEGISLATION] 218, 229 (Michiyo Hamada ed., 1999). SCAP wanted results fast, and

one Japanese participant remarked that "we really did too much too soon." TANAKA,
supra note 53, at 322. According to Takeo Suzuki, Salwin was not particularly genteel
at all times. When Suzuki remarked to Salwin, "you are focusing completely on American law, but how about the Continental system? To completely ignore it strikes me as
strange." Salwin replied, "if'you want to talk about Continental law, we've got an Austrian officer here who knows much more than you. What are you talking about?" After Suzuki stammered some more replies, Salwin said, "you're all red, Suzuki," and Suzuki reported that he never returned to the meetings. TAKEO SUZUKI, IKUSANGA:
SHOH6GAKUSHA NO OMOIDE [MANY MOUNTAINS AND RIVERS: THE MEMORIES OF A
COMMERCIAL LAw SCHOLAR] 54-55 (1993). In another version of the story, Suzuki told
Salwin that labor reforms had gone too far, and Salwin accused him of being a Communist. SUZUKI, supra note 50, at 164-66.
55 Salwin, Commercial Code, supra note
46, at 487; see also NAKAHIGASHI, supra note
51, at 23-24 (listing citations to the Illinois Business Corporation Act).
Blakemore & Yazawa, supra note
42, at 15.
57 Whitney Campbell, The Model Business
CorporationAct, Bus. LAw., July 1956, at
98,109.

2001]

PUZZLING DIVERGENCE OF CORPORATE LA W

5
Act was, by most accounts, "a landmark statute" " and "the most mod'6
Among the more innovative features of the
ern of state statutes.
1933 law included a replacement of the terms "capital stock" and
"share stock" with "stated capital" and "shares" (Section 2), a purpose
clause that enabled all activities other than banking, insurance, and
railroading to be conducted under one law (Section 3), class voting
(Section 54), and provisions for annual meetings of shareholders
(Section 26). 0
At least in part due to its modernity, the Illinois Act subsequently
became the precedent document for the Model Business Corporation
Act. As one of the Model Act's drafters notes somewhat colloquially:

You may wonder what statute the model act was modeled upon.... The
parent act is the Illinois Business Corporation Act enacted in 1933....
The reasons for this substantial use of the Illinois act are: first, the Illinois act. was an original and modern statute containing most of the principles and approaches that the committee thought desirable, and, secondly, the members of the drafting subcommittee had been participants
6
in the drafting and development of the Illinois act. '

A cynic might also note that the drafters of the Model Act were
Chicago lawyers who had participated in the drafting of the Illinois
62
Regardless, the provisions of the Model Act were eventually
statute.
mimicked by most U.S. jurisdictions, making the 1933 Illinois Act an
early precedent for modern U.S. corporate law.
In fall 1949, Salwin circulated a draft based on Illinois law and solicited the views of legal experts and economic leaders. Japanese aca-

58

Painter, supra note 3, at 635.

59

Charles W. Murdock, Why Illinois? A Comparison of Illinois and Delaware Corporate

19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 1 (1994).
Jurisprudence,
60 For

all changes, and an in-depth analysis of the 1933 law, see generally Henry

Winthrop Ballantine, A CriticalSurvey of the Illinois Business CorporationAct, 1 U. CHI. L.
REV. 357 (1934). See also Charles G. Little, The Illinois Business CorporationLaw, 28 ILL.

L. REV.997, 1001 (1934) (making value judgments on the usefulness of the provisions
in the Illinois Business Corporation Act). Ballantine points out that the Illinois statute
lacked several advances of the 1931 California General Corporation Law (of which he,
coincidentally, was a primary drafter), including provisions on voting trusts, removal of
directors, and appointment of inspectors. Ballantine, supra, at 393.
61 Campbell, supra note 57, at 100.
62 See id. at 98-99 (discussing the membership of the Committee on Corporate
Laws, which prepared the Model Act); Ray Garrett, History, Purpose and Summary of the
Model Business CorporationAct, BUS. LAw., Nov. 1950, at 1, 1 (naming the members of

the Committee on Business Corporations whose names were included in the report to
the American Bar Association that accompanied the Model Act draft).
63 See Carney, CorporateLaw, supra note 2, at 731 (providing statistics that the vast
majority of states have adopted many Model Act provisions).
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demic scholarship blossomed and was largely critical of the "drastic"
proposed increases in shareholders' rights. 64 In October, Keidanren
(the Federation of Economic Organizations), representing business
interests, submitted its first opinion papers on the proposed law. In a
sixteen-point memorandum, Keidanren supported the new law, but,
among other things, opposed provisions granting shareholders rights
to view corporate records and possess appraisal rights in mergers, recommended that derivative suits be available only to shareholders who
held at least one percent of a firm's stock, and expressed its desire for
discussions on cumulative voting for directors. 6 A similar seven-point
memorandum from the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce followed in
February 1950, in which it proposed limiting the right to sue derivatively to ten-percent shareholders, supported a requirement that
plaintiffs bringing suits against corporations post bond, and opposed
shareholders' rights to view corporate records, place restrictions on
share transfers, and have appraisal rights in mergers. 66
The two biggest controversies appear to have been shareholders'
rights to view corporate records and cumulative voting. As for the
right to view records, Japanese negotiators argued that such rights
would be exercised by labor groups or corporate rabble-rousers, and,
accordingly, wanted to require shareholders to apply to a court to view
6"[W]ith
hardly a single exception, the scholars of Japan openly opposed these
amendments.... [T]he Japanese uniformly felt that the measures required would encourage shareholder-strife and hamper honest management." Blakemore & Yazawa,
supra note 42, at 20. For critiques, see, for example, Teruhisa Ishii, Torishimariyaku
Seido Kaisei no H~k6 [Directionof the Reform of the DirectorSystem] , 1 H6S6JiI-i6 337 (1949);
J6ji Matsumoto, Kaishah Keisei Ydk5 Hihan [Critique of the Draft of the Company Law
Amendment], H6RITSUJIH6, Mar. 1950, at 158; Makoto Yazawa, Kabushikigaishah6Kaisei
no Shomondai [Various Problems on Amendments of the Company Law], 1 H65S6 JIH6 276
(1949); Teruhisa Ishii et al., Zadankai: Kaisei Kaishah6 no Shoronten [Roundtable: Points
for Debate Regarding the Revised Company Law], H6RITSU JIH6, Mar. 1950, at 195-212.
Even Takeo Suzuki, see supra note 50, found the contract theory on which shareholder
empowerment was based to be "primitive." Takeo Suzuki, Kabushiki Kaishiah6Kaisei no
H5ri [The Legal Theory Underlying the Company Law Reform], 2 SHIH6 26 (1950), cited in
Tatsuo Uemura, Senry5 to Kaishah6 Kaisei [ The Occupation and Company Law Reform],
1155.JURISUTo 21, 24 (1999).
Keizai Dantai Rengokai Sh6h6 Kaisei Iinkai, Sh6h6 Kaisei ni Kansuru Iken
[Opinion Regarding the Commercial Code Revisions] (1949), reprinted in SUZUKI, supranote 50, at 622.
W Tokyo Sh6k6 Kaigij6 Sh6jih6oki Iinkai, Sh6h6 Kaisei ni Kansuru Iken [Opinion
Regarding the Commercial Code Revisions] (1950), reprinted in SUZUKI, supra note 50,
at 623-26. As participant Tatsuo Osumi puts it, referring especially to the strengthening of shareholders' rights, "The financial circle, the academic circle, and in fact every
other group opposed the changes together." Tatsuo Osumi, Shdh6 Kaisei no lkisatsu to
Sono Shdrai [ The Circumstances and Future of the Commercial Code Revisions], H6RITSUJIH6,
June 1956, at 9.
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records. SCAP rejected this theory and rejected a subsequent Japanese draft that would have allowed management to refuse a shareholder demand if it would "remarkably harass the management" in favor of simply providing that shareholders could not abuse the
inspection right."' As for cumulative voting-an Illinois inventionthe process was no easier.8 As committee member Takeo Suzuki explained for the Japanese side, "[ilt's no exaggeration to say that nearly
half of the hard work and difficulty of the 1950 revision was spent trying to relax that requirement." 69 Nevertheless, they failed.
Although the United States made compromises,70 its position ultimately prevailed on both issues, as well as on most others, in the final
draft passed by the Diet in May 1950.71 As a result of the revisions,
shareholders' rights were dramatically increased, boards of directors
were established, the prewar power of statutory auditors was curtailed,
individual share ownership was fostered, and concepts of director accountability were introduced-all largely along the lines of the Illinois
Business Corporation Act. 2 The revisions were relatively well received

67

Memorandum of Kurt Steiner Regarding Revision of the Commerical Code

(June 27, 1949) NDL LS 10304.
68 SeeJeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational
Investors: A New Look at Cumulative
Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 124, 142 (1994) (describing the origin of cumulative voting
at the Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1870); see also Kenjir6 Egashira, Sh5jih6
[Enterprise Law], AMERIKAH6 72 (1996) (discussing Illinois ancestry of cumulative voting).
SUZUKI, supra note 50, at 168. The committee chair, in an eloquent
letter to
Eisenstein, stated that his studies with Edward Warren at Harvard Law School led him
"personally" to agree with the introduction of cumulative voting, but he made it clear
that his position as Chairman of the Committee was insufficient to persuade the entire
Committee in the face of Bar and Chamber of Commerce opposition. Letter from
Kenzo Takayanagi, Chairman, Commercial Law Subcommittee, to Irving Eisenstein,
Member, Antitrust and Cartels Division of the Economic and Scientific Section, NDL
ESS(E) 06787.
70 See Salwin, Commercial Code, supra note 46, at
488 (noting three major compromises that went into the Commercial Code).
71 See id. at 488, 497-510 (discussing Code reforms that for the most part satisfied
the United States' economic democratization objectives with regard to corporate practices).
72 Although the 1950-51 revisions were based
largely on Illinois law, they were not
a wholesale importation. Some very non-Illinois provisions remained in Japan-the
most prominent examples being the German internal auditor system, the corporate
registration system, and directors' liability to noncreditor third parties where directors
have acted in bad faith or have committed gross negligence resulting in injury to third
parties. SH6H6, art. 266, para. 3 ("If directors have been guilty of wrongful intent or of
gross negligence in respect of the assumption of their duties, they shall be jointly and
severally liable in damages to third parties also."); OLD COMM. CODE 177 (describing
the 1950 revisions that added the requirement of gross negligence or bad faith). See
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by the relevant interest groups, at least in part due to the solicitation
of input from the various groups and the fact that the necessity of
Code revisions had been recognized long before the Occupation.

Robert W. Dziubla, Enforcing Corporate Responsibility: Japanese CorporateDirectors'Liability
to Third Partiesfor Failure to Supervise, 18 LAW JAPAN 55 (1986). Likewise, some Illinois
concepts were not imported: Japanese companies have no by-laws, the Code contains
no requirement that firms have officers and opts instead for "representative directors"-directors who have the power to bind the company-see SHOH6, arts. 261, 262,
and Illinois general preemptive rights provisions were rejected in favor of a menu listing issues on which such rights could be granted. This particular compromise was
loosely based on California law. See Blakemore & Yazawa, supra note 42, at 22 ("This
provision is the unfortunate result of a compromise reached between the SCAP component of the drafting committee, which advocated the recognition of a general preemptive right as provided in Illinois, and Japanese members who wished to provide
such rights only in cases when the corporation's articles so specified.").
73 See, e.g., Kenzo Takayanagi, HistoricalIntroduction
to I THE CODES TRANSLATION
COMMITTEE, THE COMMERCIAL CODE OF JAPAN ANNOTATED, at ix, xxxix-xliii (1931)
(discussing need of Code amendment in light of social, economic, and political
changes in Japan); Takeo Suzuki, Kabushikigaishah6 Kaisei no Shomondai [Problems on
Amendments of the Company Law], 1 H6S6J1H6 83 (1949). When the 1950 revisions were
passed, some observers thought that the effective date of enforcement-July 1,1951would come too soon after its May 1950 passage, and that firms would not be prepared
for the drastic changes. SUZUKI, supra note 50, at 186-88. Worried about the reception
in the business community, Justin Williams, then Parliamentary and Political Division
Chief, Government Section, approached Takeo Suzuki at a dinner party at the home
of the English Ambassador's scrivener. According to Suzuki, Williams expressed worry
about the recent criticism of the revised Code's enactment date, and asked his opinion. Suzuki said that the effective date should proceed as scheduled, but said that
there were "a couple of small matters that are problematic, but if we attend to them
right away, I think that enforcement can proceed as scheduled." Williams asked Suzuki to draft a memorandum, which Suzuki then submitted to Salwin. Id. at 189-90.
Suzuki's main point had been raised by the Keidanren previously and ignored by Occupation authorities. In effect, to limit abuses, Suzuki and the Keidanren wanted to require shareholders or creditors to post a bond when suing a corporation. When Suzuki raised the issue with Salwin, the latter opposed the provision on the grounds that
it would prevent suits by persons without the requisite funds. But after negotiation,
the two men reached a compromise-the new provision would allow a court to require
a plaintiff shareholder or creditor to post a bond only if the defendant corporation
could prove to a court that the suit or request was filed by the plaintiff-or, in Suzuki's
example, a sokaiya-with wrongful intent. On his way home from the meeting, Suzuki
dropped in at the Ministry ofJustice, which gave its approval to the compromise. The
Suzuki-Salwin compromise became Article 59 of the Code and was enforced simultaneously with the 1950 revisions. Law No. 290 of 1951. Suzuki proclaimed that "[t]his
revision was like my own one-man play. It was such a trivial little thing, and I don't
know whether it had any significance whatsoever." SuzuKI, supra note 50, at 191. Contemporary scholars disagree with the self-effacing comment, and the provision still remains important in derivative actions. NAKAHIGASHI, supra note 51, at 286.
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B. Subsequent Developments

To attempt to measure the degree of similarity among Illinois, Japan, and the MBCA in 1950 and over the ensuing half-century, I rely
on a typology of MBCA provisions created by John A. MacKerron and
developed in a series of articles by William J. Carney.4 MacKerron
identified MBCA provisions and typed them into six categories: pure
enabling rules, enabling/empowerment rules, default opt-out rules,
mandatory rules, and mandatory constraints on enabling rules. Carney used a slightly modified version of MacKerron's typology to examine the adoption of MBCA provisions in each of the fifty states, relying
on comments to the MBCA that listed states of adoption as well as
state-by-state searches.
Crucially, Carney did not catalog all of the MBCA provisions catalogued by MacKerron. MacKerron's list is nothing if not thorough; it
details some 569 provisions, or 610 including definitions. 75 Caey
pares this exhaustive list down to 142 important provisions, which are
the focus of my study. The reduction of the list of MBCA provisions
by more than seventy-five percent helps mitigate the possibility that
any observed effects are on purely trivial or redundant provisions.
I take MacKerron and Carney's methodology two steps further by
adding temporal and transnational dimensions. To track code developments over time, I examined each of the three codes-the MBCA,
the Japanese Commercial Code, and the Illinois Business Corporation
Act of 1933-in every year since 1950, a test facilitated by the systems'
common history. In total, including the analysis of Delaware law that I
added for comparison, I examined 142 provisions in four jurisdictions
for each year in a fifty-year period for a total of 28,400 provision-year
observations. I use the MBCA typology to attempt to answer two discrete questions: (a) How similar were the codes in 1950? and (b) How
similar are the codes today?
Using the 142 MBCA provisions listed in Carney's study, I noted,

See Carney, Corporate Law, supra note 2, at 730 (describing how the author's
analysis modifies and builds upon the MacKerron framework); Carney, PoliticalEconomy, supra note 27, at 319-27 (using the MacKerron framework to analyze European
Community corporate law); John A. MacKerron, A Taxonomy of the Revised Model Business CorporationAct, 61 UMKC L. REV. 663, 664-686 (1993) (enumerating, discussing,
74

and summarizing a Revised Model Business Code Act typology). My analysis, and Carney's, omits from MacKerron's list "provisions that duplicate other provisions of general laws, codifications of common law rules, and certain redundant or trivial rules," as
well as MBCA revisions adopted after 1992. Carney, Corporate Law, supra note 2, at 730.
75 MacKerron, supra note 74,
at 665 & n.12.
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in each case, the date of adoption of a similar provision, if any, in each
76
of the four jurisdictions. I use 1950 (the date of the adoption of the
new Japanese Commercial Code and the MBCA) as a baseline and assign 1950 as the adoption date for a provision adopted in any jurisdiction in 1950 or earlier. Provisions with pre-1950 roots conceivably
might have some qualitative differences with 1950 revisions. I do not,
however, investigate such distinctions in detail, in part because the
origins are notoriously difficult to assess and, in part, because largescale reform suggests an integration of the existing provisions into the
new legal framework.
Although the MBCA is not adopted in toto in any single jurisdiction, the MBCA's typology nevertheless presents a convenient and
relatively accurate metric by which all three systems can be measured.
The methodology has been tested, and more scholars and practitioners are familiar with the MBCA model than with the law of either Japan or Delaware. Moreover, after the starting date of 1950, it is the
MBCA, not the Illinois code, that becomes a standard model (along
with Delaware) for development both in the United States and among
Japanese policymakers who look to the U.S. system for answers. As
Carney has shown, substantial uniformity (74.4% on the 142 provisions) exists between the MBCA and the statutes of the several states. 77
Although Delaware case law is often copied,78 the MBCA remains the
backbone of U.S. statutory corporate law."' Finally, the most thorough
recent revision of the MBCA occurred more than seventeen years ago,
a period of time that should be sufficient for jurisdictions to examine
even the more recent provisions with care.
In his study, Carney takes a formal approach that focuses on the
syntax of each corporate law provision. This approach makes sense if

76

See generally SENGO 50-NEN KAISHAH6 SHINENHY6 8 (Shjih6mu Kenkyukai ed.,

1995) (Japan); SUZUKI, supra note 50 UJapan); THE CORPORATION LAW COMMITTEE OF
BAR ASSOCIATION, ILLINOIS BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED

THE CHICAGO

(1934) (Illinois);JOSIAH MARVEL, DELAWARE CORPORATIONS AND RECEIVERSHIPS (4th
ed. 1929) (Delaware); RODMAN WARD, JR., ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW (4th ed. 1998 & Supp. 1999) (Delaware).
77 Carney reports that the 142 provisions are adopted in an average
of 37.21 states,
or 74.4% of the states, and that seventy-seven of those provisions are adopted in forty
or more states. Carney, Corporate Law, supra note 2, at 731.
78 See, e.g., Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp., 978 F.
Supp. 1342, 1346 (D. Nev.
1997) ("Where, as here, there is no Nevada statutory or case law on point for an issue
of corporate law, this Court finds persuasive authority in Delaware case law.").
See Michael P. Dooley & Michael D. Goldman, Some ComparisonsBetween
the Model
Business CorporationAct and the Delaware General CorporationLaw, 56 Bus. LAW. 737, 738
(2001) ("[T]he [MBCA] is the dominant model for state corporation statutes.").
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one is attempting to measure the direct dispersion of MBCA provisions as Carney did, s° but here my goal is to track broad similarities
among systems to determine whether, and to what extent, convergence has occurred. Given that the institutional environments in
which the systems function differ dramatically, and that the standard
comparative law definition of convergence is "the phenomenon of
similar solutions in different legal systems," 1 I take a slightly different
approach.
I classify a provision as functionally similar if its function, as expressed by the language of the statute and any accompanying commentary, is substantially similar."' I do not classify statutes as functionally similar if they simply serve the same broad corporate governance
goal. I classify the following three examples (each involving Japan,
the most difficult jurisdiction for side-by-side comparison if for no
other reason than language) as functionally similar, although they
may not have been necessarily so classified using Carney's methodology:
The MBCA requires a minimum of ten days' notice before
813
shareholders' meetings. Japan's Code requires a minimum of two
weeks.84
80 See, e.g., Carney, CorporateLaw, supra note 2, at 765 n.229,
769 n.271 (counting
uniformity only if the state statute contains the specific terms "special meetings" or
"redeemable shares"). While Carney takes a formal approach in most cases, a close
reading of his work occasionally reveals a functional approach. See id. at 761 nn.181 &
187 (finding uniformity in all fifty states despite statutory differences); Carney, Political
Economy, supra note 27, at 320 ("I treat public filings with state corporation officials as
equivalent to publication for comparison purposes .... ").
81 Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative
Law and Economics, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 5 (1994).
82 For the MBCA, commentary was limited to the annotated
MBCA. For Illinois
and Delaware, in the handful of cases in which similarity was ambiguous, I relied on
annotations to those codes and occasionally to cited cases. For Japan, a civil law jurisdiction, I relied on both court opinions (particularly those cited in the commentary to
2002 MOHAN RoPP6 [MODEL CODE] (Haneri Ropp6 Henshii Iinkai ed., 2001) and
scholarly commentary to illuminate ambiguous provisions. Particularly helpful were
MASAHIRO KITAZAWA, KAISHAH6 [COMPANY LAW] 283-85 (1982); KEN'ICHIRO OSUMI,
KABUNUSHI SOKAI [SHAREHOLDERS' MEETINGS] (1974); TAKEO SUZUKI, KAISHAH6
[COMPANY LAW] 158 (5th ed. 1994); MISAO TATSUTA, KAISHAHO [COMPANY LAW] 110
(2d ed. 1991); CHii SHAKU KAISHAH6 [COMPANY LAw COMMENTARY] (Katsur6 Ueyanagi et al. eds., particularly KABUSHIKI (1) and (2), both 1986, and KABUSHIKI KAISHA
NO KIKAN (1) (1986) and (2) (1987)); and TEIKAN SAKUSEI, HENKO NO TEBIKI
[HANDBOOK OF ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION CREATION AND AMENDMENT] 5 (Shigekazu Torikai ed., 1998). In each jurisdiction, I of course may have missed case law
that is not directly responsive to statutory provisions.
83 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.05
(3d ed. 1997).
84 SH6H6 art. 232.
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* The MBCA explicitly states that a director may resign at any
time. 8 Although the Japanese Commercial Code has no such explicit
provision, it does provide that directors are governed by the provisions
that govern mandates,8Mand the Civil Code provides that a mandate
may be rescinded at any time.87
* The MBCA explicitly states that shareholders may vote through a
voting agreement.8 8 Although the Japanese Commercial Code has no
such explicit provision, the Japanese Civil Code and related case law
provide that such agreements prevail over Commercial Code voting
89
provisions so long as they are not contrary to public policy.
In almost all cases, the proper classification seemed relatively
clear.9 Nevertheless, as a check on possible bias, I had two assistantsa Japanese corporate lawyer trained in the United States and a Japanese-speaking American corporate lawyer practicing in New Yorkcode 100 provisions, including all those for which the proper classification might be ambiguous. Although this process does not eliminate
bias, and I acknowledge that "[t]he rule ordinarily symbolizes far
more than its bare text states,"91 the finding of a high degree of coding
consistency among the three of us, even on these relatively uncertain
provisions, suggests that my individual coding methods were not
unique. 2
1. Baseline: 1950
First, I examine the similarities in 1950 among the three codes

85

MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.07.

86

SH6H6, art. 254, para. 3.
MINP6, art. 651, para. 1; see MASAHIRO

87
88

KITAZAWA,

KAISHAHO 328 (2d ed. 1982).

MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §
7.31.
MINP6, arts. 90, 91; Meisei Kensetsu

Kogyo K.K. v. Ogami, 1325 Hanji 140
(Kyoto D.C. Feb. 3, 1989) (upholding share transfer restriction agreement).
90 While a functional approach may
not yield unassailable results in every case, it is
likely to provide more insights into the convergence question than a rigid formal approach, and it seems no less precise than the "legal family" classifications based on legal systems' country of origin and other amorphous factors that dominate recent literature. See Coffee, supra note 26, at 8 ("[F]ormal legal convergence may be less
important than functional convergence."). Perhaps in part because of the size of the
database, I still found the results using a formal approach such as Carney's to be sub89

stantially similar. See Figure 1 and Part II.B.2 infra. The minor differences do not affect the analysis of this Article.
91 Merryman, supra note 17,
at 230.
92

The average correlation coefficient for inter-rater reliability was 0.973. See gen-

erally EDwARD G. CARMINES & RICHARD A. ZELLER, RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

ASSESSMENT 43-48 (1979) (outlining the calculation of a reliability coefficient).
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with similar origins. 3 Two measures are useful: first, I examine the
number of provisions adopted in 1950 that eventually became part of
the MBCA.9 4 In 1950, the MBCA had adopted sixty-eight of the 142
important provisions that would eventually be incorporated into the
modem MBCA, while Japan had adopted seventy-nine provisions, and
Second, I examined the
Illinois adopted seventy-six provisions.9
adoption in 1950 of the sixty-eight provisions of the modern MBCA in
force in 1950. Of these sixty-eight provisions, Japan in 1950 had
96
In short, the data supadopted forty-nine, and Illinois sixty-three.
that
while
Japan and Illinois may
port the historical story, suggesting
not have been strictly identical, corporate law in 1950 did not differ
substantially amongJapan, Illinois, and the MBCA.
Table 1: Provisions Adopted in Each Jurisdiction

juridicton

MBCA
Japan
Illinois

A. Number of
modern MBCA
provisions adopted

B. Number of
1950 MBCA
provisions adopted

C. Number of
modem MBCA
provisions adopted

in 1950

in 1950

in 2000

68
79
76

68
49
63

142
86
113

2. Convergence or Divergence? 2000
The best evidence of convergence or divergence among the jurisI also examined the twenty-three provisions of the Japanese Code considered
"important" by its primary drafter, Lester Salwin, in a 1962 Georgetown Law Journalarticle. Salwin, Commercial Code, supra note 46, at 497-510. The list is essentially identical
to that of Japanese scholars. See Osamu Mimura et al., Zadankai, Ripp6 Tant~kan ga
Kataru Sengo no Kaishah5 Kaisei Jij6 [Roundtable: The Circumstances of Postwar Company
Law Revision as Told by Those Persons in Charge of Legislation], in three parts, 1229 SHoJI
H6MU 8, 1230 SH6JI H6MU 6, 1231 SH6JI H6Mu 8 (1990), at 1229 SH6JI H6MU 13. Of
these twenty-three provisions, fifteen are clearly and directly linked to the Illinois
Code.
94 In Part V, I attempt to measure the relative importance
of these provisions,
which are already judged to be the important ones of the entire lot of 560 provisions.
But for now, I focus on the purely quantitative measure.
95 See infta Table 1, Column A (listing the number of modem
MBCA provisions
adopted in 1950).
See infra Table 1, Column B (listing the number of 1950 MBCA provisions
adopted in 1950). Viewed formally, the three jurisdictions were uniform on thirty provisions in 1950; by 2000 that figure had risen to only forty-one, an increase of 37%.
Using a functional approach, the jurisdictions were uniform on forty-five provisions in
1950 and eighty-one in 2000, an increase of 80%.
93
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dictions should come from a comparison of 1950 commonality with
2000 commonality. Compare the Table 1 data in Column C with
those in Columns A and B. The numbers reflect an increase in adoptions of laws in each jurisdiction; for some corporate law problems, jurisdictions have adopted similar solutions over the fifty-year period.
Figure 1 shows this increase for all three jurisdictions using a functional approach, for Illinois and Japan alone using a functional approach, and, for comparison, all three jurisdictions using a formal approach such as Carney's, which relies on specific statutory language.
The higher initial uniformity between Illinois and Japan reflects
the direct borrowing undertaken in 1950 by the occupation authorities. Note, however, that by 1985, the functionally common provisions
among those two jurisdictions are equal to the number of functionally
common provisions in all three jurisdictions, tentatively suggesting
mild convergence. This development is largely due to the 1983 revision of Illinois' corporate law, through which it adopted several MBCA
provisions that had already been incorporated into the Japanese
7
code.

97 See, e.g., Painter, supra note 3, at 635
(providing history of the Illinois Business
Corporation Law's revision in 1983). It is difficult to discern a distinct pattern from a
comparison of Illinois andJapanese adoptions of MBCA provisions. Of the thirty-three
MBCA provisions adopted in Illinois but not in Japan, thirteen were adopted by Illinois
during the 1983 overhaul. The adoption rate among the fifty states (as reported by
Carney) of those thirty-three MBCA provisions is 37.75 states, a number almost identical to the overall MBCA provision adoption rate. Supra note 77. Of the ten MBCA
provisions adopted in Japan but not in Illinois, all were adopted in Japan in 1950, and
six were not adopted by the MBCA until 1984, suggesting little post-1950 MBCA-based
innovation in Japan. Those ten provisions are adopted in an average of only 23.7
states.

PUZZLING DIVERGENCE OF CORPORATE LAW

2001]

Figure 1. Number of Common Provisions Across Jurisdictions
90
80
r

V

.- -

70
81)

S60

C 40
,30

-

E 20)
z10
0
1950
--

1955 1960 1965 1970

1975 1980 1985 1990

Functional, 3Jurisdictions -*Literal, 3Jurisdictions --.-

1995 2000

Functional, Japan-Illinois

The gradual increase in the number of functionally common provisions indicates an increase in common solutions, but not necessarily
convergence. As law expands to address a variety of new problems, we
might expect to find an increase in the raw total number of common
solutions over time between any two systems in virtually any field. To
measure convergence using the MBCA metric, one must take into account the large number of post-1950 MCBA provisions on which the
jurisdictions disagree. In percentage terms, the proportions of adoptions of modem MBCA provisions in 2000 are lower than the proportions of adoptions of 1950 MBCA provisions in 1950. 9" Compared to
the degree of convergence in 1950, the evidence suggests less total
convergence in 2000. Although the differences-about twelve percent each-are not huge, they do not suggest a trend toward convergence.

98

See infra Table 2 (comparing the percentage of provisions adopted in each ju-

risdiction).
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Table 2: Percentage of Provisions Adopted in Each Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction

A. Percentage of
1950 MBCA provisions

B. Percentage of
modem MBCA provisions

adopted in 1950

adopted in 2000

MBCA

100%

100%

Japan
Illinois

72.1%
92.6%

60.6%
79.6%

Under some definitions of convergence, it might be appropriate
to count all "corporate law" provisions in the three jurisdictions to
produce measures of the total similarity and total difference among the
statutes over time. I conducted such an experiment for two jurisdictions, Japan and the MBCA. By my count of nontrivial provisions,
27.7% of Japan's provisions were common with the MBCA in 1950,
and 26.8% in 2000. 99 Put another way, if Japanese Company Law and
the MBCA were combined into one statute, 20% of the total package
would be duplicative in 1950, and only 18.6% in 2000. Although this
measure is less precise than those of Table 2,100 the resulting evidence

99

MacKerron counts 569 provisions for the modern MBCA, of which Carney

judges 142 to be important. Supra text accompanying note 75. In the 1950 MBCA,
sixty-eight of Carney's important provisions exist, out of a total, by my count, of 368
provisions. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACr (1950); Carney, CorporateLaw, supra note 2, at 76073. By contrast, in Japan, the 1950 Company section of the Commercial Code contains
878 provisions, while the comparable measure for 2000 is 1,342. COMMERCIAL CODE
OFJAPAN (1950); COMMERCIAL CODE OFJAPAN (2000). Eliminating redundant and
trivial provisions, as Carney did, I count 177 provisions in Japan in 1950, and 321 in
2000. In Japan in 1950, of 177 Company section provisions, 49, or 27.7%, were in
common with the MBCA, while in Japan in 2000, of 321 provisions, 86, or 26.8%, were
provisions commonly held with the MBCA. If all nontrivial provisions are summed,
Japan and the MBCA combined in 1950 for a total of 245 provisions, of which 49, or
20%, are common, and in 2000, combined for a total of 463, of which 86, or 18.6%,
are common.
100This measure is less accurate for two reasons. First, one of the primary goals of
the project is to track the evolution of observed similarities over time, not to catalog a
myriad of differences. While the number of similar provisions is confined to the baseline MBCA measure, the number of differing provisions is potentially infinite. Second,
the tally of dissimilar provisions necessitates the creation of stark boundaries on the
scope of what constitutes "corporate law." This task is extremely difficult. The Company section of the Commercial Code includes many provisions that are not part of the
MBCA, but which might appear elsewhere in U.S. law. But a definition of corporate
law that includes all provisions affecting corporate governance is far too broad, implicating such diverse areas as employment law, bankruptcy provisions, and judge-made
law such as Delaware rules regarding takeovers. Accordingly, I choose to rely primarily
on MacKerron's and Carney's established methodology of measuring similar provisions
using a common baseline, including a reliance on what constitutes a "provision," with
the understanding that this method may not necessarily encompass all potential defini-
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provides mild support for, or at least does not directly contradict, the
above findings, as the proportion of common provisions has fallen
over time by this measure as well.
Divergence-or the lack of substantial convergence-is further
demonstrated by the differences in the rates of MBCA provision adoptions. Figure 2 compares the adoptions of modern MBCA provisions
in each jurisdiction and adds Delaware, the leading corporate law jurisdiction in the United States. The data are interesting for at least
two reasons. First, despite a common starting point in the law, the results over time for the jurisdictions fantail away from convergence.
Second, note that while the differences among jurisdictions are not
grossly divergent, Japan is slowest to adopt MBCA-compatible provisions over time. While Japan begins in 1950 with more modern MBCA
provisions than any other jurisdiction (almost identical to Illinois,
from which it borrowed), its position is reversed by 2000.
The development of corporate law in these jurisdictions presents a
bit of a puzzle. Why is it that despite relatively similar starting points,
the systems diverge? At least three simple explanations, focusing particularly on Japan, have potential to explain the difference.
First, perhaps there is something institutionally different about
Japan's legal system that leads to few Commercial Code reforms. Differences between civil and common law systems may indeed account
for some
differences, despite my efforts to account for case law differ101
ences.
But note that the "flatlining" of Japanese development seen
in Figure 2 occurs only in relation to MBCA-compatible provisions. As
Part III will show, Japanese corporate law changes often; the Japanese
Commercial Code has been subject to eleven major revisions since
1950, more than most U.S. corporate law regimes operating in the
common law system. In fact, the Japanese Commercial Code and related laws have been revised more times-and have been subject to
more major revisions-in the postwar era than any other of the codes
that comprise the core of Japan's civil law • system,
each of which was
102
initially overhauled during the Occupation.
Moreover, more new
provisions have been added to the Japanese Commercial Code than to
the MBCA since their 1950 adoptions.01 3 Divergence results not

tional nuances of "convergence."
101See supra text accompanying note 81 (discussing the challenges in comparing
legal rules in different legal system).
102 See infra Table 3 (listing the number ofJapanese code revisions since 1950).
103 See supra Table 1 and supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text
(comparing the
number of provisions adopted inJapan with the number adopted in the MBCA).
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because of a lack of revision in Japan, but because the revisions implemented in Japan do not follow the MBCA pattern.
Table 3: Japanese Code Revisions Since 1950
Code
-Civil Code
-Commercial Code

-Criminal Code
-Code of Criminal Procedure

Number of Revisions
24
29

11
23

Source: Revision tables in 2002 MOHAN RoPP6 1030-31, 1296-1301, 1919, 2108-09 (Haneri
Ropp6 Hensh6 linkai ed., 2001)."

The fact that Japan has not followed the MBCA pattern suggests a
second explanation based on a lack of direct continuing influence.
Perhaps there is no reason to expectJapan to adopt MBCA provisions,
or provisions that mimic those of the MBCA, after the Occupation reformers leave in 1950. It would not be surprising if, when Japan regained control of its legal system, it started making adaptations to the
"imposed" code.
Although this explanation is possible, three factors suggest it is
not a complete answer. First, the Japanese political process of corporate law revision almost always involves a thorough examination of solutions adopted in foreign (non-Japanese) legal systems, particularly
the U.S. system, and particularly the MBCA approach. In fact, in my
experience, the MBCA is more readily available in bookstores in Tokyo than in New York. 0 5 IfJapan is rejecting foreign solutions, it is doing so systematically after intense, and arguably useless, evaluation.
Second, although Japan could be slow in general to accept transplanted systems, it seems unlikely thatJapan is still "getting used to" its
transplanted corporate law after fifty years. Finally, it also seems unlikely that Japanese law reform leaders are rejecting MBCA solutions
as a sort of backlash in which efficiency takes a backseat to politics.'",

104 This source does not contain tables of revisions for Japan's two
other major
codes, the Code of Civil Procedure, which is interconnected with many other procedural laws, or the Constitution, which has never been revised.
105 The MBCA is published in Japanese as AMERIKA MOHAN KAISHAHO
(Mashiro
Kitazawa ed., 1988).
106 See generally MarkJ. Roe, Essay, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L.
REv. 217, 217 (1998)
(describing how "[p]olitics can disrupt markets" and lead voters to "see market arrangements as unfair, leading them to lash back and disrupt otherwise efficient arrangements").
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Although some backlash to Occupation reforms occurred in the first
revision after the end of the Occupation, reversal was not a continuing
trend. Of the multitude of revisions imposed by Occupation officials
in 1950, as Part III will show, only three-mandatory cumulative voting, share transfer restriction prohibitions, and a requirement that
preemptive rights appear in a company's charter and apply to all future stock issuances-were flatly reversed in the ensuing years. That
these reversals occurred over an extended period of time-in 1955,
1966, and 1974, respectively-at least suggests that decisions were
based on changing conditions and not merely knee-jerk political backlash.
Finally, perhaps the system's substantial uniformity on MBCA provisions in 1950 means that the most logical subsequent development is
divergence. Certainly the starting point matters. 1 7 Still, the commonmeasure divergence seen here would appear to directly contradict
elementary notions of evolution-toward-efficiency and path dependence in legal development. Theories of efficient development of corporate law suggest that similar economic selection pressures will lead
to similar corporate law solutions. 8 Path dependence theory further
suggests that systems that begin with a common statutory starting
point should be expected to adopt provisions that fit within that existing path-creating framework.' 0°
It is true that in many aspects Japan is different from the United
States; so different, in fact, that a differing pattern of corporate law
development might at first glance not be terribly surprising. But as
this discussion has shown, the differences that are most likely to affect
corporate law development directly are small, the statutory starting
points are remarkably similar, and existing theory strongly suggests
thatJapan would follow the MBCA pattern. This separation of theory
Assuming similar rates of adoption of identical provisions
as a percentage of
total adoptions in two or more jurisdictions, the starting point may determine whether
the subsequent general trend is one of convergence or divergence. If two systems with
no common provisions at T, adopt 10% common provisions, the outcome at T2 will be
convergence. If two systems with 100% convergence at T, adopt iO% common provisions, the outcome at T will be divergence. In this case, however, I am not measuring
aggregate adoptions, but adoptions of a common, standardized set of provisions.
See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26
J.L. & ECON. 375, 377 (1983) ("Two concepts of the firm motivate [economic theorists] to level the charge of social inefficiency at the modern corporation: their conception of the firm in economic theory and their contrasting conception of the real
modern corporation.").
109As this Article suggests, a broader definition of "starting
point" to include institutional factors may lead to a different analysis.
107
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from the empirical reality that I have documented here, as well as the
differing degrees to which the four jurisdictions depicted in Figure 2
comport with theory, suggest the need for a more complex and subtle
explanation. Although part of that explanation may come from
sources outside the scope of this Article such as corporate social
norms and other practices, an explanation basing differences in the
institutional environment of corporate law is nevertheless robust.
III. JAPANESE CORPORATE LAW DEVELOPMENT
The study of the development ofJapanese corporate law over time
highlights an important feature of the system: the high degree to
which it relies on exogenous shocks to instigate reform. Although reliance on exogenous shocks may not be the only reason why U.S. and
Japanese laws have diverged, it is an observed trend that fits the data
presented in Part II well. I first discuss the institutions that affect corporate law development in Japan. I then briefly discuss process, and
finally relate a narrative of Japanese corporate law history to provide
concrete examples of the exogenous shock phenomenon.
A. Institutions
In this section, I discuss five broad groupings of institutions and
related organizations that are particularly important in contrasting the
development of corporate law in Japan with that of the United States:
(1) corporate governance institutions, (2) formal state policymaking
institutions and organizations, (3) foreign relations constraints, (4)
corporate enforcement institutions, and (5) the organized bar. This
list is by no means complete, but should serve as a guide for understanding the development of Japanese corporate law discussed in the
remainder of this Part.
1.

Corporate Governance Institutions

As in other systems, corporate governance constraints influence
the path of corporate law in Japan. One particular group of institutions stands out: those that empower Japanese corporate managers.
Due at least in part to a combination of the lack of a well-functioning
market for corporate control, back-loaded compensation plans, historically weak enforcement of fiduciary duties, and a tendency to
promote directors solely from the ranks of inside employees, Japanese
managers have developed into a powerful force in the policymaking
process.
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Japanese managers are well represented by various business organizations. Japan has 14,000 business organizations, nearly twice as
many per capita as the United States."
Four prominent national
business organizations serve almost exclusively political functions, the
most powerful of which is the Federation of Economic Organizations,
or Keidanren,which includes more than 800 ofJapan's largest corporations and 100 trade and industrial organizations."'
Still, it would be a mistake to infer from these data that either uniformity in the Japanese business community or an anti-shareholder
stance among managers exists. Although business interests tend to
aggregate during good times, they also tend to splinter during economic downturns, and the interests of small and large businesses often fail to coalesce. And while shareholder and managerial interests
are occasionally at odds, the search for capital often leads managers to
the same institutional arrangements favored by shareholders.
2. Formal State Policymaking Institutions and Organizations
The rules of the state policymaking game give rise to two organizations that are especially prominent in Japanese corporate law development: the bureaucracy and advisory committees. Of course, bureaucrats do not formally comprise an interest group. Nonetheless,
110Yutaka Tsujinaka, Japan's Civil Society Organizations
in Comparative Perspective, in
THE STATE OF CIVIL SOCIETY INJAPAN (FrankJ. Schwartz & Susan J. Pharr eds., forthcoming 2002). Many businesses were founded during the Occupation (48.8% of the
most influential interest groups, and 44.3% of business and financial groups were
founded during 1946-55). Michio Muramatsu & Ellis S. Krauss, The Conservative Policy
Line and the Development of PatternedPluralism, in 1 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN:
THE DOMESTIC TRANSFORMATION 516, 522 (Kozo Yamamura & Yasukichi Yasuba eds.,
1987).
III Besides Keidanren, the Japan Federation of Employers'
Associations (Nikkeiren)
has 30,000 employers and is primarily concerned with labor-management relations.
Nikkeiren, at http://www.nikkeiren.or.jp (last visited Jan. 7, 2002). The Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Nissho) is a broad organization composed mostly of
small- and medium-sized businesses and serves as the central organ of 478 regional
chambers of commerce. Although it is not without influence, as the former chairman
of the Federation of Economic Organizations once said during the euphoria of the
late 1950s, "it is just as hard to organize medium and small enterprises as it is to make
imported rice stick together in a ball." T.J. PEMPEL, REGIME SHIFT: COMPARATIVE
DYNAMICS OF THEJAPANESE POLITICAL ECONOMY 95 (1998). Finally, the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai D~yukai, formerly translated as the Council for
Economic Development) includes roughly 1,400 top business leaders from 900 companies and differs from the other three organizations in that it purports to be nonpartisan and is composed exclusively of individuals.
See Keizai D6yukai, at
http://www.doyukai.or.jp/E-index.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2002) (describing the organization).
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although there may be slack in any agency relationship, bureaucrats
12
are elected politicians.
who
agents,
their
please
to
attempt
normally
Politicians, in turn, attempt to please the groups that are able to lobby
them most effectively, which often turn out to be corporate interest
groups. In the corporate law context, policymaking government officials are primarily employees of the Ministry of Justice, but also include employees of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI), and, to a lesser extent, academic advisors from public universities. Academic advisors enjoy
somewhat greater flexibility but technically remain public servants.
Disagreement between government and academics, and among the
branches of government, is commonplace.""
An important part of the policymaking mix is the advisory com4
mittee institution, or shingikai.' Advisory committees play an important role in the policy development process. As Curtis Milhaupt and
Geoffrey Miller note:
Although the committees are often derided as ornamental rubber
stamps, to dismiss them as meaningless would be a serious mistake. In
fact, the committees perform an important role in facilitating group decision-making and resolving disputes. This they accomplish in a number
of ways. They provide a supplementary channel for public-private interaction beyond the means previously described. They serve as listening
posts for ministry officials while shielding the bureaucrats from direct
exposure to interest group influences, and they give affected interests a
stake in policy outcomes, since interested parties participate in the proc112

SeeJ. MARK RAMSEVER & FRANCES MCCALL ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN'S POLITICAL

99-120 (1993) (noting that while Japanese bureaucrats exercise a great
by the elected legislature).
deal of power, they are still largely controlledMITI
AND THE BREAKDOWN OF JAPANESE
MARKETPLACE
113

See ScOTT CALLON, DIVIDED SUN:

at 33-34 (1995) (expounding on the tenand the Science and Technology
Education,
of
Ministry
sion between MITI, the
Agency).
HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1975-1993,

114

See FRANKJ. SCHWARTZ, ADVICE & CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF CONSULTATION

INJAPAN 48-115 (1998) (describing the role and importance of shingikai as an advisory
body). Advisory committees appear to reflect Japanese social conditions but actually
are inventions of the occupation authorities. In this case, Occupation authorities established committees through the National Administrative Organization Act, see Kokka
Gy6sei Soshiki H6 [National Government Organization Law], Law No. 120 of 1948, art.
8 ("[E]ach administrative organ specified in Article 3... can establish consultative
bodies by law [that include] knowledgeable and experienced persons .... "), in order
"to limit bureaucratic power, open up and better integrate state administration, and
pluralize participation in government policymaking, as well as to solicit outside ad-

vice." SCHWARTZ, supra, at 48; see also Ehud Harari,Japanese Politics of Advice in Comparative Perspective: A Frameworkfor Analysis and a Case Study, 22 PUB. POL'Y 537, 539 (1974)

(noting that the present system of public advisory bodies in Japan was "established by
legislation in 1947").
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15

Members include scholars, lawyers, politicians, interest group representatives (including representatives from business groups), and bureaucrats. Members are paid small honoraria (reportedly Y20,000 to
Y40,000 per meeting in 1995) but reap other benefits in the form of
personal connections, prestige, and the ability to influence national
policy.
In the case of the Commercial Code, the most important ad-

115 CurtisJ'. Milhaupt & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Cooperation, Conflict, and Convergence in
Japanese Finance: Evidence from the "usen" Problem, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1,
15
(1997). It is tempting to find something 'Japanese" in an area such as this-policymaking and big business should fit the shopworn models. Some who have examined
the Japanese system argue that it reflects a tendency in the Japanese legislative
and
administrative rulemaking processes toward preclearance of decisions over postclearance. See David G. Litt et al., Politics, Bureaucracies,and FinancialMarkets: Bank
Entry
into CommercialPaper Underwritingin the United States andJapan, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
369,
430-46 (1990) (explaining the preclearance/postclearance distinction in how conflict
is expressed and resolved in America andJapan, and noting that Japan relies more
on
the preclearance stage). In Japan, parties meet and develop consensus first, which
reduces legal challenges later, while in the United States greater reliance is placed
on
postclearance conflict resolution mechanisms such as litigation and judicial decisions.
Id. But the committee system operates similarly in the United States:
The current standard process to develop an amendment from within the
Committee is as follows: First there is a preliminary discussion of a problem

by the full Committee .... [Then,] a small subcommittee is appointed...

to

develop a position and prepare the text of the proposed amendment ....The
drafts ... are discussed by the full Committee and usually returned to the subcommittee for further refinement.... [T]he proposal may be approved "on
second reading" and published in the Business Lawyer....
Robert W. Hamilton, Reflections of a Reporter, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1455, 1459-60 (1985).
See
generally Jonathan R. Macey, The Transformation of the American Law Institute, 61 GEO.
WAsH. L. REV. 1212, 1212 (1993) (providing an analysis of the reform process of
the
American Law Institute "from a sociological, anthropological, and public choice"
point
of view). A broad range of institutional roadblocks may also limit postclearance litigation in Japan and the Japanese "no explicit rule means prohibition" regulatory norm
limits litigation over gray-area innovation. See Hideki Kanda, Developments inJapanese
Securities Regulation: An Overview, 29 INT'L LAW. 599, 609 (1995) ("An important
customary rule exists in the financial services area in Japan; that is, the nonexistence of
an
explicit legal rule endorsing a certain activity ...is understood to mean that such activity is prohibited.").
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 114, at 76 (explaining
that while monetary compensation is small, members reap other benefits such as "inspection missions abroad[,] ...
personal connections that can result in profitable opportunities[,] ...access to information that might be inaccessible[;] ...bask in prestige; or enjoy the satisfaction
of
having their ideas reflected in public policy and making a contribution to society").
Although sometimes a decisive element in the policymaking process, the decisions
of
committees are not legally subject to review because "they are considered internal
government behavior that does not directly affect the legal rights or duties of private citizens." FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWARJAPAN 171 (1987). The
same is true for the process of appointing committee members, establishing committee

6
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visory committee is the Ministry of Justice's Legislative Committee,
which encompasses the Commercial Code and Company Law Subcommittees, whose members, though chosen by the Ministry ofJustice
7
bureaucrats, are often closely watched by politicians."
Although the Commercial Code Subcommittee is a standing body,
it rarely meets to discuss abstractly the provisions that would make
ideal law, as MBCA drafters purport to do. Nor does it often strike out
on its own or even in direct response to specific interest group pressures, as committee-led change requires systemic input from many
and varied constituency groups. In practice, the Subcommittee only
meets intensely and discusses matters of substance when prompted by
exogenous shocks as directed by the bureaucracy. Partly because of
the need for input from various constituencies, Subcommittee-led
change tends to be relatively slow, prompting calls from some corners
to abolish the system."s
3.

Foreign Institutional Constraints

In Japan as elsewhere, foreign pressure can influence the domestic decision-making process. In Japan, where access to formal mechanisms for policy change by nonbusiness interests often are limited by
institutional barriers, such outside pressure is often thought to have
particular force." 9 As with many other exogenous stimuli, government officials become actors in two-level games, forced to compete in
Foreign pressure is likely to be particularly
two political arenas.
agendas, and the "ghost-writing" of their reports by bureaucrats. See id. at 199 ("Nor
do MITI's actions in appointing shingikai members... reach the level of legal formality necessary forjudicial review.").
117 In February 1999, the Ministry of Justice announced that it would no longer
appoint bureaucrats to the Legislative Committee. Hoseishin, Kanryoiin Zempai e [BureaucratMembers on Legislative Committee to be Abolished], ASAHI SHINBUN, Feb. 17, 1999,
at 1.
tL8See Ichir6 Kawamoto, H~sei Shingikai
to Sh6h6 [The Legislative Committee and
CommercialLaw], 1147 JURISUTO 69 (1998).
119 See, e.g., ROBERT M. ORR, JR., THE EMERGENCE OF JAPAN'S FOREIGN AID POWER
(1990) (discussing the role of gaiatsu in the Gulf War); Glen Fukushima, Gaiatsu Has
Outlived Its Usefulness,JAPAN TIMES WKLY., Nov. 16, 1991, at 1 (criticizing Japan's overreliance on foreign pressure as a means for policy change).
120

See, e.g., GEORGE TSEBELIS, NESTED GAMES: RATIONAL CHOICE IN COMPARATIVE

POLITICS (1990) (discussing variations in game theory in the political context). In addition, Robert Putnam has commented:
The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived of as
a two-level game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests
by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek
power by constructing coalitions among these groups. At the international
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powerful when it is linked to specific endogenous domestic pressures
that encourage the co-participation of domestic interest groups. 121
4.

Corporate Law Enforcement Institutions

Corporate law enforcement institutions such as rules regarding
corporate disclosure, shareholder derivative suits, prosecutorial discretion, and judicial enforcement powers play an especially important
role in determining what sorts of newsworthy corporate-related events
may arise. With stronger enforcement mechanisms, change-inducing
scandals might not occur.
One particular example of the influence of such institutions is the
sokaiya. A sokaiya (literally, "general meeting operator") is usually a
nominal shareholder who either attempts to extort money from a
company's managers by threatening to disrupt its annual shareholders' meeting with embarrassing or hostile questions, or works for a
company's management to suppress dissent at the meeting. 2 As I
have discussed elsewhere, sokaiya historically have flourished in Japan
because relatively noncompetitive Japanese corporate law and governance institutions lead to low levels of corporate disclosure.' 23 As Part
III.C shows, many Japanese corporate law provisions were enacted in
direct response to sokaiya; in their absence, much of Japanese corporate law would make little sense.
5.

The Organized Bar

Of particular interest when comparing Japanese and U.S. corporate law development is the relative absence of lawyers in the Japanese
process. Unlike a federalist system in which local attorneys compete
for fees, Japan is unitary not only in its corporate chartering system

level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.
Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L
ORG. 427, 434 (1988).
121 See LEONARD J. SCHOPPA, BARGAINING
WITHJAPAN 23 (1997) ("What makes foreign pressure effective, therefore, may not be raw power as much as it is the ability of a nation to take advantage of the web of interests that bind, not just itself, but its partnersas well");
see also Putnam, supra note 120, at 434 (setting forth a theoretical model from which
Schopa draws synergies between domestic and foreign pressure).
2 See Mark D. West, Information, Institutions, and
Extortion in Japan and the United
States: MakingSense of Sokaiya Racketeers, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 767, 767 (1999) [hereinafter
West, Sokaiya Racketeers] (defining sokaiya, a specific type of shareholder).
123 Id. at 769.
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but also in its attorney-licensing institutions. Accordingly, while Japanese attorneys, like attorneys everywhere, attempt to maximize their
revenues, the dynamics differ. In every system, in the absence of rules
that directly result in attorney revenue maximization, attorneys are
most likely to favor rules that their clients favor in order to maintain
clients. In addition, there exist institutional roadblocks to shareholder litigation and a cartel-like monopoly on legal services that allows attorneys to choose the highest revenue-generating cases. As a
result, attorneys in Japan are more likely to represent corporations
than investor or anti-corporate interests, and in turn to support-if
they publicly support any policy-managerial interests.
Yet there is little support for any corporate issue from the organized Bar. The Japan Federation of Bar Associations issues resolutions
and recommendations relating to social issues but rarely to economic
ones. One possible explanation for the seeming lack of interest is
simply the size of the Japanese Bar. With fewer than 17,000 attorneys,
most of whom have highly diversified practices that do not depend on
corporate law as a large and irreplaceable source of income, the Bar
as an organization may have relatively little incentive to press proactively for corporate law changes even if the opportunities existed.
Moreover, institutional restrictions on shareholder litigation and
shareholders' rights ensure that virtually no active plaintiffs' bar exists
in Japan. Due to the lack of a class action mechanism, and the lack of
economic incentives to bring derivative suits until 1993, only a hand25
These inful of attorneys are self-identified as plaintiffs' attorneys.
stitutional constraints have engendered a system in which very few attorneys have strong incentives to support corporate law revisions.
B. Process
1.

General

EveryJapanese corporate law revision from 1950 to 1999 follows
the basic Ministry-of-Justice-designed pattern of Legislative Council and
Commercial Law Subcommittee meetings, solicitation of opinions from
affected groups, Subcommittee discussion of outline, Subcommittee de-

124
125

See infra text accompanying notes 199-201.
See Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL

STUD. 351, 365 (2001) [hereinafter West, Why Shareholders Sue] ("[T]he small number

of attorneys in Japan matters in the derivative-suit context because only licensed attorneys... may bring such suits.").
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cision on outline, presentation and decision by the full Legislative Council, drafting of bill by Ministry of Justice, presentation to cabinet, approval by cabinet,
submission to Diet,. Diet Justice
Committee delibera•
-1211
tions, enactment, promulgation, effectiveness.
Within the Ministry of Justice, corporate law revisions are managed
primarily by the Councillor's Office, which is primarily responsible for
general legislative reform, and the Fourth Division of the Civil Affairs
Bureau, which is generally responsible for commercial matters (particularly registration, a capacity in which it is not dissimilar to a Secretary of State), and the balance between the two depends on the specific issues and the personnel involved.'
These organs are said to be
understaffed, and the actual drafting (and ironing out to make compatible with other laws, such as the Civil Code) is usually undertaken
by three or four members of the Ministry of Justice, a relatively small
number compared to other types of revisions.
One hallmark of the Japanese corporate law revision process is the
examination of foreign legal systems. 12 8 As one frequent advisory
committee member told me, "All I have to do is make sure that I have
a handle on what the Americans, the British, and the Germans do. I
lay out the basic workings of those systems, give the pros and cons of
each, and everyone oohs and aahs. That's almost always how solutions
are narrowed down to a manageable list.' 2 9 Given the degree to
which Japan has imported much of its formal legal framework in the
last 100 years, perhaps it is of little surprise that this system is not
unique to the corporate law.
2.

Comparison

Perhaps the most striking feature of the above process to a U.S.
observer is the relative lack of lawyer involvement. Much is written on
the U.S. process. With differences to be sure, one basic, nearly universal conclusion is that the primary actors are lawyers, legal academics, and, in common law creation, judges.3 0 As Jonathan Macey and

126

Mitsuo Suzuki, "Sh~ji Hdmu" 40-nen Shishi [Forty-Year Histoiy of "Commercial Law"

Journal], 1402 S-6JI H6MU 11 (1995).
127 Mimura et al., supra note 93, at 1229 SH6JI H6MU 8, 11-12 (statement of Tokyo
District CourtJudge Takeo Inaba).
See generally Shigeru Morimoto, K6kai Kaishah6 no Bapponteki Kaisei
to Hikakuh6
Kenkyd [Dramatic Revision of Company Law and the Study of ComparativeLaw], 1568 SHOJI
H6Mu 44 (2000) (laying out the hierarchy of the Ministry ofJustice).
129 Interview with anonymous member of
advisory committee, in Tokyo (July 10,
1999).
130See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Recent Changes to the Model Business
CorporationAct:
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Geoffrey Miller put it in the context of the leading corporate law jurisdiction, "Delaware law reflects a political equilibrium among the
various interest groups within the state in which the lawyers enjoy a
dominant position.'' In the context of the MBCA, which serves less
easily identifiable consumers, it has been argued that "the large law
firm lawyers that dominate the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws
2
have been unmindful of their proper role.""
In Japan, however, lawyers play a less dominant role. Instead, as
the forgoing analysis suggests, the primary decision makers are bureaucrats and advisory committee members. Corporations heavily
lobby each of these groups. In addition, in the case advisory committees, corporations often receive direct representation in the legislative
process. In the case of bureaucrats, the political constraints that derive from corporate contributions to elected politicians create powerful incentives as well.
The resources available for influencing policy probably differ little
in each system. But to make explicit claims that are only implicit in
the previous section, the role of lawyers in the U.S. system may result
in more direct financial incentives for change. Bureaucrats and
committee members may be wined and dined (subject to increasingly
strict rules) in Japan. But opportunities for direct financial benefit may
be more numerous and lucrative in the United States, where primary
decision makers in the legal decision-making process often report directly to corporate interests. As a result, U.S. corporate lawyers, who
can profit quickly from enhanced legal fees, appear to be much more
proactive in seeking corporate law changes than their Japanese counterparts.

Death Knells far Main Street CorporationLaw, 72 NEB. L. REV. 259 (1993) (discussing the
interplay of events and actors that led to the recent changes to the MBCA); Campbell,
supra note 57, at 99 (describing the committee membership of those who drafted the
MBCA); William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Ieflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663, 670 (1974) ('judicial decisions in Delaware illustrate that the Courts have undertaken to carry out the 'public policy' of the state and create a 'favorable climate' for
management."); Garrett, supra note 62, at 1 (listing the members of the committee
that prepared the MBCA); Hamilton, supra note 115, at 1456-57 (discussing the American Bar Association's role in developing the MBCA); Macey, supra note 115, at 1212
(analyzing the law reform process of the American Law Institute from "sociological,
anthropological, and public choice" perspectives); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469,
469 (1987) (using "an interest-group theory of regulation to explain and predict the
legal rules that affect the affairs of corporations chartered in Delaware").
'.1 Macey & Miller, supra note 130, at 473.
132Branson, supra note 130, at 294.
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3. Japanese Data Availability
The process of corporate law reform in Japan is relatively public.
Drafts and abbreviated minutes of Subcommittee meetings are circulated to interested parties, reprinted in trade magazines and legal
journals, and, more recently, uploaded on the Ministry of Justice's
homepage. 13' The Subcommittee often specifically requests, and regularly receives, detailed comments on pending legislative plans from
various policy and interest groups, including the Bar, universities, and
economic organizations; these opinions are often published as well.
For these reasons, in conjunction with interviews of many persons involved in the process, it is possible to sketch out a relatively detailed
picture ofJapanese corporate law development.
C. Developments
The history of corporate law development in Japan may be loosely
divided into three periods: The Boom Years (1951-1979), Scandal and
Reform (1980-1989), and Post-Bubble (1990-present). In each period,
differing forms of exogenous shocks guide corporate law development.
1. The BoomYears (1951-1979)
Although scholarship critical of the new foreign-induced 1950
Commercial Code had always been present, 31 4 a concerted attack by
academics apparently began with the publication of Tatsuo Osumi's
"Does the Revised Commercial Code Need to Be Re-Revised?" in May
1951.135 Osumi cited several problems with the shareholderdemocracy-flavored Code, including the potential for abuse that
might arise from giving all shareholders the ability to enjoin directors
(Article 272) or file a derivative suit (Article 267), or from giving
three-percent shareholders the right to call a special meeting (Article
237) or apply to the court for the removal of a director (Article
133Japan's Ministry of Justice, at http://www.moj.go.jp
(last visited Oct. 21, 2001).
For English content, see http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/index.html.
134 See, e.g., Suzuki, supra note 73 (listing
the problems with the 1950 Commercial
Code); Yazawa, supra note 64 (same).
135 Tatsuo Osumi, Kaisei Shh6 ha Saikaisei o Hitsuy6 to Suru ka [Does the Revised

Commercial Code Need to Be Re-Revised?], 26 SANGY6 KEIRI 50 (May 1951). For a discussion of the article's impact, see SHOH6 KAISEI NO D6K6 TO KIHON MONDAI [TRENDS
AND BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE COMMERCIAL CODE REVISIONS] 152 (Kaisha Jitsumu
Ky6kai ed., 1961).
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Other academic criticism followed, most focusing on the
257)
"problem" of giving shareholders an extensive list of rights that would
137
interfere with firm management.
Not surprisingly, the business community voiced agreement with
these criticisms. 3 8 The Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, along with Keidanren, the Japan Shipbuilders' Association, and other groups, advocated restoring directors' terms to three years instead of the 1950
mandate of two years and the elimination of mandatory cumulative
voting. 1 ' The Tokyo Chamber of Commerce additionally advocated
the elimination of derivative suits and preemptive rights restrictions,
and supported an exception for small transactions from the general
rule that directors cannot enter into transactions with the company
went so far as to propose
without approval. 14 A Keio University group
141
the elimination of directors' duty of loyalty.
In response to the criticisms, the Code was revised. In August of
1954, the Commercial Law Subcommittee submitted a proposed plan
to revise the Code, and the Diet passed it in 1955. The most major
substantive changes of the new law were (1) to reverse the 1950 policy
of requiring preemptive rights provisions to be in the articles instead
by allowing the board to specify (in the absence of a provision in the
articles) whether such rights would be granted with each new stock issuance, 4 2 and (2) to require a three-percent shareholder to wait thirty
that
days (formerly two weeks) without receiving notice of a meeting
4
3
she had proposed before taking such matter to the court.1
The next changes to the Commercial Code were the 1962 changes
in accounting rules. 144 The primary impetus for the relatively minor

Osumi, supra note 135, at 9.
137See, e.g., Teruhisa Ishii, Sh5h6 Kaieseigo ni Nokosareta Mondai [The Problems
That
Remain After the Commercial Code Revisions], 26 SANGY6 KEIRI 8, 9 (Aug. 1951); Si-161 6
1,36

KAISEI

NO D6K6TO KIHON

138

See generally SHOHO

MONDAI, supra note

135, at 158.

KAISEI NI KANSURU IKENSFIU [COLLECTION OF OPINIONS

ABOUT THE REVISED COMMERCIAL CODE]

(HSmusho Minjikyoku ed., 1952) (docu-

menting growing resentment of shareholders' rights).
139 TOKYO SHOKOKAIGIJO, KABUSHIKI KAISHAiO KAISEI IKEN CHOSA [SURVEY
OF

OPINIONS REGARDING COMPANY LAW REVISIONS] 27-28 (1952), reprinted in
KAISEI NO D6K6 TO KIHON MONDAI, supra note 135, at 198-99.

SH61,I6

140

Id.

141

SH6FI6 KAISEI NO D6K6 TO KIHON MONDAI, supra note 135, at 202, 249-52.

142 SH6ii6, arts. 166, 347, 280-2; see also Masahiro Kitazawa, Kabushiki Kaisha no

Shoyil Keiei Shihai [Ownership, Management, and Rules of Corporations], in 9 GENDAI H6:
GENDAI H6 TO KIGYO 58, 84-85 (Makoto Yazawa ed., 1966) (discussing policy change).
143 SHOI-lO, art. 257.
144 See Kitazawa, supra note 142, at 85-86 (describing the accounting rule changes
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1962 revisions was changes to the Securities Act in 1957 regarding the
inspection of financial affairs of public corporations by certified public accountants. Relevant Commercial Code provisions were revised to
iron out contradictions in accounting standards between the Code
and the Securities Act. The changes were changes only in form, and
none directly affected governance.145
In 1966, two factors led to change; one international, one domestic. Internationally, many Japanese companies needed to get financing from abroad (through American and European Depository Rights
(ADRs and EDRs)), ""I which required changes to provisions regarding
multiple proxies for shareholders, conversion period for convertible
debt, and transfers and issuances of new shares. Corporate practitioners pressed strongly for such changes.47 Domestically, more practical problems with the 1950 Code such as share transfer restrictions,
transfer method provisions, mergers, and issues pertaining to the conversion of no par stock made transactions difficult.148 Accordingly, in
1966, the Diet, continuing the postwar trend of financial deregulation, enacted provisions permitting stock transfer restrictions in order
to allow a close company to prevent an outsider from coming in and
"abusing" her rights, says a member of the committee.149
The next revision began as a result of the 1965 collapse of Sanyo
Special Steel Company, leaving what at the time was the largest debt
in Japanese history (forty-two billion yen, or, at the 1965 exchange
rate of 360Y to the dollar, about $117 million).'° Subsequent investigation revealed a failure of the statutory auditor system to uncover

of 1962).
115See MAKOTO YAZAWA & TsUNEO OTORI, KAISIIAHO NO TENKAI TO KADAI [THE
DEVELOI'IMENT AND THEMFS OF COMPANY LAw] 41-42 (1968) (describing changes).
Interestingly, these changes were the first in seven years, the longest streak in the postwar era. From 1954 to 1955, the Commercial Code Subcommittee of the Legislative
Advisory Committee met five times on the issue of subscriptions for new shares (provisions not enacted), three times on auditors and public accountants, and five times on
raising par value, one time in 1955 on minimum capital requirements, and from 1955
to 1956, met four times on organization of stock companies. From 1954 to 1957, the
Subcommittee met three times on international maritime shipments of goods. From
1958 to 1962, they met thirty-seven times, and from 1962 to 1964, they met fourteen
times for 1962 and 1966 revisions, respectively. id.
H6 SeeYCiz6 NIIYAMA, KAISHAI-O NO SHIKUMI NO HATARAKI [FORM
AND FUNCTION
OF COMI'AN LAw] 45 (1996) (describing finance process).
1,17 Mimura et al., supra note 93, at 1229 SiH6JI
H6MU 17, 30.
1.1 YAZAWA & OTORI, supra note
145, at 55-62.
H9 /d. at 59.
1501ICHIR6 KAWAMOTO ET AL., NIHON NO KAISHAHO (JAPANESE COMPANY LAw] 50
(2d ed. 1998); SUZUKI, supra note 50, at 480.
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questionable accounting practices by directors. 1' As a result of this
and other similar scandals, a movement arose to strengthen the statu152
tory auditor's role and the auditing of accounts in large companies.
Although the work of the Commercial Law Subcommittee until now
had been focused largely on financial deregulation, it now was forced
to turn its attention to the issue of how to strengthen corporate governance mechanisms.
The Subcommittee focused on two areas. First, it increased the
financial auditing power of statutory auditors, requiring them, among
other things, to audit balance sheets. 1 3 Second, the 1974 Subcommit151See Malcolm D.H. Smith, The 1974 Revision of the Commercial
Code and Related Leg-

islation, 7 LAwJAPAN 113, 118-21 (1974) (detailing the changes promulgated as a reaction to inefficient corporate auditing).
Id.
153 SHOHO, art. 281.
The measure passed over the opposition of tax attorneys.
SUZUKI, supra note 50, at 493-99. The Subcommittee was faced with four plans for
strengthening the role of the internal (statutory) auditor, an office appointed by
shareholders to supervise directors. See Mimura et al., supra note 93, at 1230 SH6JI
H6MU 9-11 (providing statements of Osamu Mimura and Shigeyuki Maeda); Junko
Ueda, Nihon teki Kikan Kosei e no Ketsudan [Deciding Toward a Japanese Organizational
Structure], in NIHON KAISHA RIPPO NO REKISHITEKI TENKAI [THE HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT OFJAPANESE CORPORATE LEGISLATION] 369, 376 (Michiyo Hamada ed.,
1999). An analogue in the United States is Michigan's independent director. See Cyril
Moscow et al., Michigan's Independent Director,46 Bus. LAW. 57 (1990) (analyzing a
statutory change in Michigan prompted by the need to combat abuse of the corporate
process). Under Plan A, the basic corporate governance structure would not be altered, but the financial auditing powers of auditors would be increased. Mimura et al.,
supra note 93, at 1230 SH6jI H6Mu 10-11 (providing statements of Osamu Mimura and
Shigeyuki Maeda). Under Plan B, following the pre-1950 Code pattern, the management supervisory powers of auditors would be increased, slightly altering the corporate
governance calculus. Id. Plan C was dubbed the "German plan," as it followed the
German model of establishing a board of auditors that would have not only management supervisory powers, but also the power to hire and fire directors. Id. Finally,
Plan D was the so-called "American plan" of eliminating auditors altogether and instead strengthening the auditing function of the board of directors itself. Id. In the
end, Plan A was passed. Id. According to Osamu Mimura, one of the drafters of the
1974 revisions, the failure of Plans C and D was inevitable, as the two plans split the
opinions of those who would have favored adopting any sort of foreign system. Id.
Moreover, he explains, Plan D would have required a reconfiguration ofJapanese corporate governance to separate management responsibility from directorial oversight,
as both functions are currently played by employee-directors. Id. In the end, therefore, the choice was between two plans: A and B. Plan B, which involved little systemic
borrowing, if any, emerged victorious, partially as a result of Plan A's potential redundancy in light of the auditing functions of public accountants proscribed by the Securities and Exchange Law. Id. Keidanren initially favored Plan D, but flip-flopped to support Plan B, according to some sources, out of a realization that Plan D would require
a complete reconstruction of employment and promotion policies in many corporations. See Mimura et al., supra note 93, at 1229 SH6jI H6MU 21-22 (providing a statement of Takeo Inaba).
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tee once again tackled cumulative voting. The pre-1974 Code had required cumulative voting if demanded by any shareholder. A corporation could prohibit cumulative voting in its articles of incorporation,
but the articles could be overridden by shareholders holding onefourth or more of the issued shares.
Shareholders seldom demanded cumulative voting, 5 5 but fears remained. In a rough tradeoff
for the strengthening of auditors imposed on corporations, the 1974
revisions allowed corporations to opt out of the rule in their articles of
incorporation.156
Following the 1974 revisions, Japan made a rare-and ultimately
unsuccessful-attempt of systematic reform not guided by exogenous
shock but by endogenous momentum. The Civil Affairs Division of
the Ministry of Justice distributed an extensive questionnaire to the
legal and business community in Japan, soliciting opinions on nothing
less than:
the advisability of amending the existing provisions relating to social responsibility of the corporation, the role of the general meeting of shareholders, the structure of the board of directors, the value of each share,
and whether to institute provisions designed to make a distinction between large and small corporations in the application of the statutory
157
corporate system.

Based in part on the results of the questionnaire, in 1977 that office compiled three sets of draft revisions-one related to the stock
system, one related to governance, and one related to accounting and
disclosure.'5 8 The initial plan was to ground all future Code revisions
154 SH6H6,

art. 256-3 (amended 1974).

155See, e.g., DAN FENNO HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE
IN JAPAN 260 (1973)

("[Five hundred eighty-eight] out of five hundred eighty-nine companies [surveyed]
have provisions against cumulative voting in their articles of incorporation."); Christopher Lee Heftel, Note, Corporate Governance in Japan: The Position of Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations,5 U. HAW. L. REv. 135, 163 n.182 (1983) ("Cumulative voting is
possible for the election of directors, but in practice is rarely, if ever, used.").
156 SH6H6, art.
256-3.
157 Councillor's Office, Civil Affairs Bureau,
Japanese Ministry of Justice, English
Cover Letter to June 12, 1975, Commercial Law Questionnaire, reprinted in Comment,
Commercial Law Reform in Japan: The CurrentDebate, 11 LAWJAPAN 102, 102 (1978).
158H6musho Minjikyoku Sanjikanshitsu, Kabushiki seido ni kansuru
kaisei Shian
[Draft Revised Provisions Relating to Stock System], May 26, 1977, in TAKEO SUZUKI &
AKIO TAKEUCHI, KAISHAH6 [COMPANY LAw] 459 (1981); H6musho Minjikyoku Sanjikanshitsu, Kabushiki kaisha no kikan ni kansuru kaisei Shian [Draft Revised Provisions
Relating to Corporate Organs], Dec. 25, 1978, in SUZUKI & TAKEUCHI, supra, at 465;
H6musho Minjikyoku Sanjikanshitsu, Kabushiki kaisha no keisan, k6kai ni kansuru
kaisei Shian [Draft Revised Provisions Relating to Corporate Accounting and Disclosure], Dec. 25, 1979, in SUZUKI & TAKEUCHI, supra, at 475. After discussion, these
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in that document. However, in practice, as a Ministry of Justice official explains, the revisions listed in the document only occurred when
they became "urgent matters as determined by basic governmental
strategies and needs of the economic world,"'5 each as influenced by
exogenous factors-as exemplified by the next set of reforms.
2.

Scandal and Reform (1980-1989)

Change in the 1980s began, as it often did, with Takeo Suzuki
(1905-1995), who symbolizes the postwar development of Japanese
corporate law more than any other individual. Suzuki, whose family
founded the giant Ajinomoto food company, 60 taught at the University of Tokyo from 1931 until his retirement in 1986 (and subsequently at Sophia University) and was dean of the law school from
1957 to 1959. He was formally involved in six postwar revisions of the
Code, often a leader of the Commercial Code Subcommittee, 6' and
his scholarship greatly influenced Japanese commercial caselaw and
legislation. 2 As Suzuki writes of the events leading up to the 1981 revisions:
I was at a party [in 1975] when Yoshimi Furui, who was then the Minister
ofJustice, said he wanted to speak with me. He said, "Lots of people feel
strongly that to keep companies and the financial world from misbehaving, the government is eventually going to have to be the one to do some
sort of auditing. But whether auditing is to be done by the Ministry of
Justice or the Ministry of Finance, I think that sort of thing should be
done not by the government, but by the companies themselves." When I
answered, "Of course," he said, "Well then, why don't you revise the
Commercial Code? When can you have it completed?" I said, "Several
years," and he said, "That's a real problem. Can't you do something
drafts were combined and released in May 1986 as a document called "Draft Revised
Commercial Code and Limited Liability Company Law." H6musho Minjikyoku Sanjikanshitsu, Sh5h6 Yigengaishah6 Kaisei Shian, in three parts: 865JURISUTO 10, 12, 19-25;
866JURISUTo 86, 88-99; 867JURISUTo 88, 92-109 (1986) (sidebar to Akio Takeuchi et
al., ChishoKaishaRipp6,865JuRISUTO 10, 866JURISUTo 88, 867JURISUTo 88 (1986)).
159 K6ji Harada, Kaishah5seino Kadai to Tenb5 [ The Prospects
for and Issues of the Com-

pany Law System], 1514 SH6JI H6Mu 46, 47 (1999).
60SUZUKI, supra note 50, at 567-68.
161See generally Hitoshi Maeda et al., Zadankai, Sh6h6 Kaisei Shinbi ni Okeru Suzuki
Sensei [Roundtable, Professor Suzuki and Commercial Law Reform], 1422 SHOJI H6MU 20
(1996) [hereinafter Professor Suzuki and CommercialLaw Reform] (detailing Suzuki's con-

tributions to the Commercial Code debate); Hitoshi Maeda et al., Zadankai, Suzuki
Takeo Sensei no Ningen to Gakumon [Roundtable, The Personality and Studies of Professor
Takeo Suzuki], 1102 SH6ji H6MU 12 (1994) (same).
162 See Shigeyuki Maeda, Suzuki Gakusetsu no Hanrei e no
Eiky6 [The Influence of Suzuki's Scholarshipon Caselaw], 1422 SH6Ji H6MU 48 (1996) (arguing that Suzuki's schol-

arship greatly influenced the development ofJapanese corporate caselaw).
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faster? Even if you just do it piece by piece, please do it quickly." The
first half of the complete revision was the 1981 revisions.163
The 1981 revisions, proposed by the Legislative Council on December 24, 1980, passed by the Diet in 1981, and made effective in

198264 constituted the most complete revision of the Code since
1950. On the surface, the revisions-the most important of which can
be grouped into six categories-appear to be an odd hodgepodge of
unrelated provisions:
* Statutory auditor. A statutory auditor may call for the convening
of a meeting of the board if she determines that a director has violated the law or the corporation's articles of association. 165
* Directors. A board of directors may not defer to a single director
to decide such matters as the disposition of material property, material loans, appointments, and dismissal of important employees, or establishment of a branch office. 16" Each director must report to the full

board at least four times per year on "conditions of administration of
affairs. '' ' The transactions of directors that compete with the company must be approved by a majority board vote (formerly a two-thirds
shareholder vote).'6
* Stock ownership rights. A corporation may not give any of its property to shareholders as remuneration for the exercise or non-exercise
of their rights of stock ownership."'
* Shareholders' meetings. Shareholders were given the right to make
proposals,7 directors and auditors have a duty to explain relevant
matters, and the chairman has the authority to expedite proceed172
ings.
* Share value. All shares, whether par or no-par, must have a value
7
of at least Y50,000 (approximately $200 in 1982) per share.' '

163 SUZUKI, supra note
50, at 62-63.
164 Sh6h6 nado no ichibu o kaisei

suru h6ritsu [Law to Revise a Portion of the

Commercial Code], Law No. 74 of 1981.
165SI-I6H6, art. 260-3, para. 2-3.
166 Id. at art. 260, para 2.
167Id. at art.

260, para 3.

168Id. at art. 264.
169 Id. at art. 294-2.
170Id . a t a rt. 23 2 -2.
171

Id. at art. 237-3.

Id. at art. 237-4, para. 2; see also Akio Takeuchi, Kaisei shdh6ka no
kabushiki s6kai
[Shareholders' Meetings Under the Revised Commercial Code], 994 SH6I9 H6Mu 864 (1983)
(describing revisions).
73 SII6H6, arts. 166(2), 168-3.
172
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e Voting. As a general rule, a subsidiary cannot hold shares in its
parent. If Corporation A holds more than one-quarter of Corporation
Corporation B cannot vote any shares it holds in
B's issued shares,
74
A.1
Corporation
Upon close examination, these six seemingly unrelated changes
are tied to three related phenomena that required tinkering with corporate governance mechanisms: scandal, sokaiya, and intercorporate
shareholdings.
a. Political and Corporate Scandal. As Suzuki's anecdote suggests,
many of the 1981 revisions grew out of scandal. 75 The Lockheed
scandal began as a result of 1976 testimony by Lockheed president A.
Carl Kotchian before a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and other highranking Japanese government and business leaders had accepted
Airways. 176
bribes to promote sales of Lockheed planes to All Nippon
This revelation led to an uncovering of massive illicit corporate activities, to indictments in 1976 of the Prime Minister, and to a trial that
stretched from January 1977 to January 1983 and ended in a guilty
verdict that surprised no one (one newspaper poll of the Japanese
public showed that only four percent believed Tanaka's denials; eighty
percent thought him guilty).177
Scandals such as Lockheed did not necessarily point to corporate
governance problems; in fact, especially given heavy regulation and
the relatively small chance of detection, bribing politicians could have
been a profit-maximizing strategy. Still, as a result of the scandal, calls
for reform increased. Many voices urged external regulation through
some government body, but the Subcommittee, chaired by Suzuki,
preferred self-regulation . 7 Accordingly, it countered with accounting
174 Id. at art. 211-2, para. 1; id. at art. 241,
para. 3.
175

See Ichir6 Kawamoto, Kabunushi S~kai no Genj6 to H~kaisei no Hitsuy6 [The Cur-

rent State of Shareholders' Meetings and the Need for Legal Revision], H6GAKU SEMINAA, June
1979, at 64, 64-65 (showing that before Suzuki's party, corporate scandal was a hot
topic of Diet debate).
176 Also accused were the President of All Nippon Airways, the
Secretary General
of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the MITI Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of Transportation, the Chairman of the LDP's Special Committee on
Aviation, and both the current and former parliamentary vice ministers of transportation. JACOB M. SCHLESINGER, SHADOW SHOGUNS: THE RISE AND FALL OF JAPAN'S
POSTWAR POLITICAL MACHINE 82-90 (1997).
177 Id. at 147-52.
178 See Takeo Suzuki, Sh~wa gojjrokunen kaishah6 kaisei no seiritsu
[The Establishment
of the 1981 Company Law Amendments], 747 JURISUTO 22 (1981) (arguing for selfregulation of corporate governance).
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disclosure and checks on the board, such as the first two revisions
listed above. 79
b. Sokaiya Scandal. The next three listed 1981 revisions were
aimed specifically at the sokaiya, ° whose blackmail activities were seen
as a potential international embarrassment after the Lockheed bribery
scandal. Most directly, the stock ownership rights provision prohibits
a company from purchasing a sokaiya's silence. The other two provisions were intended to chill sokaiya activity indirectly. By giving legitimate shareholders rights at shareholders' meetings, it was hoped
that the nondisclosure of information on which sokaiya prey could be
remedied. And by raising the price of stock, the aim was to limit the
ability of a sokaiya to purchase a nominal share in a corporation for
the purpose of disrupting the shareholders' meeting. 181 Less significant 1981 revisions not listed above-such as allowing a court to refuse a shareholder's request to view board minutes if such viewing
would cause damages to the corporation,"" or reviving a 1938 Code
provision allowing a court to dismiss a procedural challenge of a
shareholder resolution if the alleged procedural violation is immaterial 1813-were also aimed squarely at sokaiya's abusive tactics. 184
c. IntercorporateShareholdings. Some of the blame for political, corporate, and sokaiya scandals fell on the stable cross-shareholding system, which some thought undermined corporate responsibility. Although Occupation efforts toward widely dispersed shareholdings had
.

179 At the same time as the Commercial Code
revisions, auditing rules were revised
to require large companies to be audited by a CPA. Law Regarding Exceptional Rules
of the Commercial Code Concerning Auditing, etc., of Corporations, as amended by
Law No. 74, art. 2,June 9, 1981.
180West, Sokaiya Racketeers, supra note 122, at 776 (explaining that,
effective Octo-

ber 1982, prosecutors need only prove that a benefit was offered with respect to the
exercise of shareholder rights, and that upon this proof, the courts could impose civil
and criminal penalties on both sokaiya and management).
Sokaiya, of course, knew the real purpose of the provisions. Shin Motoki,
head
of the 1981 Subcommittee, recounts the time he was approached by sokaiya:
I had just heard that annual sokaiya income was an average of 10 million yen
[about $50,000 in 1981]. A sokaiya came to me and said, "how are we supposed to make a living [after the revisions]?" I said, "you guys make an average of 10 million a year, right? That's far too much money."
Maeda et al., Professor Suzuki and Commercial Law Reform, supra note 161, at 1422 Sii6ji
H6MU 20, 33 (statement of Shin Motoki).

art. 260-4, para. 5.
Id. at art. 251.

182 SH6116,
183

Ironically, the anti-sokaiya rules that were the thrust of
Suzuki's efforts were
used successfully in 1997 to prosecute executives of the Ajinomoto Corporation, which
was founded by Suzuki's family.
184
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seen early success, the individual investor share of corporate equity
s
fell from over 60% in 1950 to 28.4% in 1982. " By itself, the increase
in corporate shareholding does not necessarily imply strong need for
reform; it simply reflects an additional corporate tier between human
investors and capital ownership. But some observers predicted dangers of collusion among corporate shareholders. Accordingly, to prevent future scandals and invigorate capital markets, individual shareholding was encouraged as an alternative. The subsidiary-parent and
cross-shareholding voting provisions listed above prompted companies to reduce their shareholdings in subsidiaries below twenty-five
percent.
3.

Post-Bubble (1990-Present)

The 1990s brought more separate corporate law revisions than any
other time in Japanese history. The first meaningful revisions after
the 1981 overhaul came in 1993.185 The Japanese economic situation
in 1993 was quite different than that of 1981. With the bursting of the
bubble in 1990, both small and big business interests were fractured.
Big business, which was internationally competitive and highly profitable, saw its primary political goal as the reduction of regulation and
taxation. Small business, which was neither competitive nor profitable, sought the maintenance of such regulation and tax benefits that
protected it from competition. Large and small businesses split not
only on the basic issues of deregulation and taxation, but also on utility and bank protection, the legality of holding companies, exchange
rate policies, and government procurement policies."" Internally,
Keidanren had also grown divided, and in 1993 halted its automatic
contributions to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). By July 1993,
the socioeconomic divisions-and another LDP bribery scandal-led

185

Daiwa Sh6ken Keizai Kenkyfijo, 1982 Kabunushi S6kai Hakusho [White Paper on

Shareholders' Meetings], 956 SH6JI H6MU 12, 14 (1982).
186 A less complete revision after the 1981 overhaul came in 1990, as drafters attempted to distinguish between large and small corporations, ostensibly to help creditors. NIIYAMA, supra note 146, at 46; Misao Tatsuta, Heisei Ninen Kaisei Shth6 no Kent6
[An Examination of the 1990 Commercial Code Revision], 1222 SH6JI H6MU 7-8 (1990).
The 1990 revisions eliminated the requirement of seven incorporators, SH6Ha, art.
165, and imposed a minimum capitalization requirement of 10 million yen, SH6H6,
art. 168-4.
187 PEMPEL, supra note 111, at 166 (chronicling how the remnants of the LDP
began to solidify a rural base of support around a program of pork-barrel politics,
whereas the conservative opposition became ever more urban, internationalist, and
opposed to regulation).
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to the split of the LDP, ending thirty-eight years of single-party domi188
nance.
Complicating this scenario further was Japan's international reputation. The 1989 failure of U.S. raider T. Boone Pickens to receive a
seat on the board of Koike Manufacturing Co., a Toyota-affiliated corporation in which his firm held a twenty-percent interest, raised eyebrows in theUnited States aboutJapan's "closed markets. '"'l ' Tensions
were fueled further by a growing trade surplus with the United States.
In 1989, the United States Trade Representative named Japan as a
target of Super 301, and at the same time, proposed the Structural
Impediments Initiatives (SII) talks. The talks began for the United
States with the broad aims of changingJapan's savings-investment balance, distribution system, land policy, exclusionary business practices,
and keiretsu business groups.190
In the Commercial Code revision context in particular, the waning influence of business on the drafting process was evident. As one
participant put it in 1990, "In the 1950s, Keidanren and other business
groups set forth extremely assertive positions on revisions in opinion
papers, but now it seems that they don't do so as much."' " Exogenous
pressures increased domestic pressures, leading to revisions of the
Commercial Code that attempted to strengthen corporate governance
through an avenue never before seriously attempted: shareholders. ,
188 See SCHLESINGER,

supra note 176, at 245-51 (discussing the socioeconomic divi-

sion in Japan that led to the split of the LDP).
See, e.g., Takao Matsuura, How a Japanese Firm Foiled
7. Boone Pickens, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 8, 1990 (recounting how, from the perspective of Koito's president,
raider Pickens had no right to demand such a seat, and in fact only owned the shares
so long as they were not repurchased pursuant to an agreement with their "actual"
owner, Kitaro Watanabe), reprinted in LAW AND INVESTMENT INJAPAN 507-10 (Yukio Yanagida et al. eds., 1994).
90 Not that the United States necessarily cared about
Japanese corporate governanceper se; it was simply responding largely to domestic "level playing-field" demands.
Mimura et al., supra note 93, at 1229 S|-16JI H6MU 8, 18
(providing a statement
by Mitsuo Suzuki).
192 Some long-time observers ofJapan
may note that corporate law is not the only
arena in which Japan appears to require foreign pressure (gaiatsu) to produce change,
see supra note 120 and accompanying text, suggesting that an institutional explanation
may be incomplete. But that charge is most often, if not always, raised in economic
and political contexts in which Japan lacks internal competition such as the legendary
lack of competition generated byJapan's electoral and legislative institutions. See, e.g.,
RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 112, at 8-10 (discussing the nearly fifty-year control the LDP has maintained over the Diet by manipulating the electorate). That lack
of competition drives exogenous stimuli is precisely my point here. Moreover, foreign
pressure is only one exogenous factor that influences corporate law development, further suggesting that foreign pressure alone is an inadequate explanation.
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a. 1993. On some SII issues, the United States was highly successful in effecting change in areas that benefited not only the U.S. but
Japan as well. 19 3 In the corporate arena, although U.S. negotiators did
not get everything on their list,' 4 one particular success stands out:
Although the prethe facilitation of shareholder derivative actions.
1993 Commercial Code included a derivative suit mechanism, it remained largely unused because it was simply too expensive for shareholders to use.9" The 1993 Commercial Code amendments"7 altered

193

See ScHOPPA, supra note 121, at 144-45 (illustrating how U.S. focus on social

infrastructure deficiencies in Japan led to increased public investment, which, for example, resulted in a cleaner environment in Japan and perhaps marginally lower trade
deficits in the future).
194 Additional U.S. demands included outside directors and "more
flexible exercise of shareholders' rights and cumulative voting." Japan Vows to Review Commercial
Code, ijiJ PRESS TICKER SERVICE, May 22, 1991, available at LEXIS.
The SII measures that pertained to the Commercial Code do not appear to
have faced particularly strong opposition from either the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) or
members of the Company Law Subcommittee. See Shigeru Morimoto, Nichibei Kz5
Mondai Ky5gi to Kabushiki Kaishah6 no Kaisei [ The Sll Talks and the Revision of the Stock
Corporation Law], 1309 SH6JI H6MU 38, 38, 43 (1993) (presenting a Subcommittee
member's discussion of impact); Shfiichi Yoshikai, Kaishah5 Kaisei Sagy6 no Genky6 ni
Tsuite [On the Current Status of the Task of Revising the Company Law], 1299 SH6JI HOMU
12, 12-13 (1992) (presenting arguments from an MoJ official that reforms are necessary to appeal to international investors). In fact, according to the MoJ official in
charge of the process, the Subcommittee "did not have sufficient time to consider all
the issues involved," and accordingly appears to have deferred much of its decision
making to a nongovernmental group-the Commercial Law Revision Research
Group-chaired by none other than Takeo Suzuki, then nearly ninety years old, and
for once not a member of the Subcommittee. KABUNUSHI NO HANRAN [SHAREHOLDER
REVOLT] 203 (Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha ed., 1993). In this sense, the SII talks may
have been most effective in raising the issue for consumer interest groups and foreign
corporations.
196 See West, Derivative Actions, supra note 5, at 1499-500 ("[T]he
U.S.-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative negotiations that began in 1990, in which shareholders'
rights in general and derivative actions in particular were a focus of discussion, may
also have contributed to the increase in derivative litigation.").
197 The 1993 amendments also included changes easing restrictions
on bond issuance. These changes are codified in and described by SH6H6, arts. 297, 309, 311, 31314, 17, 320-22, 324 and Kenjir6 Egashira, Shasaih6 no Kaisei [Revision of Bond Law], 1027
JURISUTO 34 (1993). On strengthening the role of the internal auditor (SH6Ha, art.
273), see Hitoshi Maeda, Kansayaku Seido [Auditor System], 1027 JURISUTO 27 (1993)
and Kabushikikaishia no Kansa t6 ni kansuru Shbh6 no tokurei ni kansuru Hbritsu
[Law Concerning Special Case of Commercial Law Regarding Audits], Law No. 22 of
1974, as amended in 1993, requiring large companies to have three auditors. On the
lowering of the percentage of stock ownership required to allow access to corporate
books from ten to three percent (SH6H6, art. 293-6), see Hideki Kanda, Kaikei Chdbo
716 no Etsuran Tshy6ken [The Right to Inspect and Copy Corporate Books], 1027 JuRISUTO
24 (1993). For background on all of these revisions, see generally Shfichi Yoshikai,
Heisei Gonen Kaisei Shdh6 no Gaiy6 [An Outline of the 1993 Revisions of the Commercial
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the derivative suit mechanism in two specific ways. First, unlike the
old rule that allowed only a reward of attorneys' fees, the new Code
allowed successful plaintiffs to recover damages for time and money
expended in bringing the suit as well. 1)8 Second, it lowered the
amount of required filing fees from a percentage of damages claimed
to a flat Y8,200.' 9 Many companies opposed the change, arguing that
it would bring a flood of frivolous derivative suits. 20 0 Some Japanese
academics opposed it as well, arguing that it was "a failure" that raised
worries because it "followed the American strategy," prompting some
to ask, "where the hell was the Keidanren?'' 20 1 To some extent the
doomsayers proved to be correct, as the number of derivative suits has
substantially increased.2 2 Today, the derivative suit mechanism remains one of the more controversial aspects of Japanese corporate
law. 203

Code], 1027JURISUTo 8 (1993).
198 SH6H6, art. 268-2.
199 SH6HO, art. 267; see also Minji Sosh6 Hiy6 T6 ni Kansuru H6ritsu [Law Concerning Civil Litigation Costs, Etc.], Law No. 40 of 1971, art. 4(2) (providing for filing fees
in cases of indeterminate damages). The revised filing fee system codified the decision
reached by the Tokyo High Court some ten weeks earlier, see Asai v. Iwasaki, 109
SHIRYOBAN SH6JI H6MU 70 (Tokyo H. Ct., Mar. 30, 1993), which was made in anticipation of the statutory change. See also West, Derivative Actions, supra note 5, at 1464-65,
1504-05 (discussing the change in remedies available in derivative suits following the
Nikk6 Securities Case and the 1993 Commercial Code Reform). Draft revisions usually
circulate among various interest groups in order to elicit comments, a process that often takes consistently longer than ten weeks. See Akio Takeuchi & Yasuo Hamasaki,
Sh6h6 Kaisei Sagy6 no D6k6 to Kongo no Tai6 [ Trends in the Work of Revising the Commercial
Code and FutureDevelopments], 1169 SH6JI H6MU 9, 16-17 (1989) (discussing circulation
and revision timetable).
See Keidanren Gives Mixed Reaction to Revised Law, KYODO NEWS
SERVICE, June 4,
1993; Revision of Commercial Code Rapped, JIJI PRESS TICKER SERVICE, May 22, 1991
("[I]mplementation of these proposals could lead to undue use of lawsuits against
Japanese companies."), available at LEXIS.
201 Mitsugu Kawmura et al., Zadankai, Nihon no Kaisha
no Kooporeeto Gabanansu
[Roundtable,Japanese CorporateGovernance], 1050JURISUTo 6, 26 (1994).
202 West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note
125, at 352. In early 1997, business
groups pressed for amendments to the Code that would lessen the scope of shareholders eligible to bring suits or limit director liability. See Business Sector Seeks Commercial
Code Revision, JUI PREsS TICKER SERVICE, Feb. 13, 1997 (reporting on calls in Japan's
business community for modifications to the shareholder lawsuit system), available at
LEXIS. By the end of 1997, the plan had become concrete; groups wanted amendments to empower a company auditor to ask a court to order a shareholder to withdraw a derivative suit. Though endorsed by the LDP, the plan was staunchly opposed
by academics, and failed. Academics Oppose IDP Plan to Limit Shareholders' Suits, JAPAN
WKLY. MONITOR, Nov. 17, 1997.
203 The resulting changes in rules regarding
derivative actions may be at least a
partial explanation for recent changes in Japanese governance structure. Many corpo-
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b. 1994. Potentially larger programs loomed. In the two-year period after the bubble burst in 1990, the Nikkei 225 index lost over
sixty percent of its value. °4 By March 1992, businesses pleaded for
'
some measure to invigorate the market: 25 namely, share repurchases,
06
a move that they had supported for several years and that is frequently used in the United States and other developed markets as a
signaling device (if nothing else) .207 For fear of weak capitalization
and manipulation, the Commercial Code allowed share repurchases
in only a few narrow circumstances, such as when the shares were to
208
In 1994, the Legislative Council
be retired, or pursuant to a merger.
share provisions, allowing
treasury
the
of
revision
a
recommended
companies to purchase, upon a shareholder majority vote, up to ten
percent of their shares if those shares were to be sold to directors of
employee shareholders. 29 The amendment was passed by the Diet in
1994 and came into force within six months of its enforcement date of

rations have reduced the size of their boards dramatically, while others have instituted
a system of "executive officers" who have decision-making power but are not subject to
derivative suit liability. See Shbji Hhmu Kenkyfikai, Shikk6 Yakuin Saido ni Kansuru Anketo Shdkei Kekka [Composite Results of Poll RegardingExecutive Officer System], 182 SHIRYOBAN
SHOJI H6MU 26, 26 (1999) (finding adoption by forty-five of sixty-three responding
companies of 140 polled); Shikk5 Yakuin Drnyi Kasoku [Acceleration of Introduction of Executive Officer System], NIHON KEIzT~ SHINBUN, June 25, 1999, at 3 (finding that 179
companies had adopted the Executive Officer System); see also Hiroyuki Takahashi,
Corporate Governance in Japan: Reform of Top Corporate Management Structure, 28 JAPAN
ECON. INST. REP.,July 23, 1999. While such officers are not formally authorized by the
Code, the executive officer designation appears to be unproblematic so long as that
officer is not assigned sole responsibility for acts that the Code does not allow the
board to delegate. See SH6H6, art. 260, para. 2 (enumerating the duties a board of directors is not allowed to assign to a director).
204 Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of a Central Bank in a Bubble Economy, 18 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1053, 1056 (1996).
205 See Corporate Share Buybacks Favored in Keidanren Report, NIKKEI WKLY., Mar. 7,
1992, at 3 ("Securities firms and members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party have
suggested that the ban in Japan on share buybacks be removed to resuscitate the
slumping stock market.").
See Mizuno v. Ariyoshi, 1188 SH6JI H6MU 36, 39 (Tokyo H. Ct., July 3, 1989)
(noting that the "business world" had made "frequent requests" to relax article 210);
D4yukai ProposesEasing Stock HoldingRules, JAPAN ECON.J., Mar. 5, 1988, at 15.
207 See Robert Comment & Gregg A. Jarrell, The Relative SignallingPower of DutchAuction and Fixed-Price Self-Tender Offers and Open-Market Share Repurchases, 46 J. FIN.
1243, 1253-59 (1991) (reporting positive share returns for firms engaging in stock
buybacks); George W. Fenn & Nellie Liang, Good News and Bad News About Share Repurchases (Fin. and Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper 1998-4, 1998) (reporting that
forty-one percent of U.S. firms repurchase shares).
SHOHO, art. 210.
209 SHO616, art. 210-2.
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October 1, 1994.21 °
c. 1997. By 1997, business and government interests were once
again more closely aligned. Largely as a result of Keidanren and MITI
support, the Commercial Code was revised three times in 1997.21
First, the May revisions largely concerned stock options. Before 1997,
stock options were prohibited, and would have been impossible in any
event because of the Code restrictions on treasury shares212 and the
requirement that an issuance date of new shares be designated upon
the decision to issue such shares.1 5 Occasionally, a company bypassed
the restrictions-Sony, for instance, did so in 1995 by creating bonds
with detachable warrants, issuing the ex-warrant bonds to institutional
investors, and issuing the warrants to its managers14 -but, by and
large, the lack of stock options as incentives for managerial performance was seen as an insurmountable corporate governance defect.
In response to global competition concerns and increasing corporate demands, particularly from foreign institutional investors, 21 5 the
Diet, acting without advisory committee input,2 1 6 passed a second 1997
210

Law No. 66 of 1994. Initially, few companies utilized the procedure, in part

because the retirement of treasury shares results in a tax on shareholders for the theoretically increased share value, regardless of whether the stock price actually rises. See
Kaoru Morishita, Dividend Tax Called Obstacle to Stock Buybacks, NIKKEI WKLY., June 12,
1995, at 15 (positing that, although the amended commercial code allows companies
to repurchase their own shares, only one listed company announced a buyback in the
first nine months after the change). A freeze on such taxes from November 1995 resulted in dramatic increases in buybacks. Stock Buybacks IncreasingAmong Japanese Companies, NIKKEI WKLY.,July 6, 1998, at 11.
211 See K6ji Harada, Kaishah~sei no
Kadai to Tenb6 [ The Prospectsfor and Issues of the
Company Law System], 1514 SH6JI H6MU 46, 47 (1999) (discussing 1997 revisions and
causes). On the increased role of business in recent revisions, see Shinsaku Iwahara,
Kaishah5 Kaisei no Kaiko to Tenb5 [Reflections on and Prospectsfor Company Law Revision],
1569 Sii6Ji HOMU 4,5 (2000).
212 SIIi-6H
, art. 210.
21 SI-H6, art. 280-2, para.
1, no. 2.
Waranto wo Tsukatta Insentibu Fuyo [Creating
Incentives Through Warrants], 1416
SH6JI H6MU 51 (1996).
215 CalPERS had requested a
stock option system in its Corporate Governance
Market Principles, Japan document. For the news story, see Yasushi Watanabe, Foreign
Investors Turn Up theHeat, NIKKEI WKLY.,June 15, 1998, at 12.
216 For the first time in the postwar era, the ruling
Liberal Democratic Party, in
conjunction with business groups and bureaucrats, constructed the 1997 proposal
without submitting it to the Legislative Council or airing it publicly. Scholars, normally
included in the process, were outraged. Shortly before the bill's passage, 225 commercial law scholars issued a statement in which they criticized the LDP for not following
protocol, arguing that before introducing stock options, more open discussions should
have been held on such issues as manipulation, compensation disclosure, and insider
trading. HirakaretaSh5h5 Kaisei Tetsuzuki o Motomeru Sh5h6 Gakusha Shrmei [Commercial
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bill, revising the 1994 treasury share provisions to allow options to be
issued to directors. This bill altered section 210-2 to allow purchases
of up to ten percent of a company's stock (as opposed to the previous
three percent) if those shares are issued to directors or employees (instead ofjust employees) within ten years (instead of six months). The
following month, the Code was amended to simplify mergers, including the allowance of a modified short-form merger system for smallscale and simplified required disclosures to shareholders in a merger
situation, removing a potential merger obstacle in the form of a requirement that two shareholders' meetings be required (one on the
contractual terms of the merger, one after the merger) to approve a
217
merger.
A third set of 1997 reforms came in direct response to scandal. In
1997, prosecutors uncovered the largest sokaiya scandal to date, involving scores of executives at major corporations such as Dai-Ichi Kangyo
Bank and each of the "Big Four" securities brokerages for payments to
In response, the
sokaiya of more than $100 million in aggregate.
Commercial Code was amended to provide stronger penalties for corporate payments to sokaiya.2 ' Although many in the business community opposed the measures on the grounds that the law should
punish sokaiya and not those who pay them, the scandal this time was
''
of sufficient severity to muffle their voices.

Law Scholars' Pleafor Open Commercial Law Revision Process], 1457 SII6ji H6MU 76 (1997)
(document dated May 12, 1997, first endorsed by University of Tokyo Professor Kenjir6
Egashira). For similar complaints, see Scholars Rap Bill to Allow Stock Options, JAPAN
ECON. NEWSWIRE, May 12, 1997. The scholars' problem was not substance, but process. As a group of three professors explained, "[The signatories] were seeking greater
openness in the legislative process. If the problem had been the content of the legislation, there is no way all those commercial law scholars would have agreed on it as a
group in the first place." Shigemitsu Kobayashi et al., Shdho, H6RITsUJIH6, No. 69-13,
at 98, 98 (Dec. 1997); see also Zadankai, Shh5 Kaisei to Kigpo Keiei, Jitsumu no Aikata
[Roundtable, Corporate Management and Practiceand Commercial Code Revision], 1479 SI-i61
H6Mu 12, 13 (1998) (containing the comments of Kenljir6 Egashira, first endorser of
the document, that endorsers neither opposed Diet-led legislation nor were angry at
being left out of the process).
SHOi6, art. 413; Law No. 71 of 1997.
218 See West, Sokaiya Racketeers, supra note 122, at 767-68 (discussing the
scandal,
the roles played by the corporations, and the consequences of the scandal's exposure).
219 SFIO-16,
arts. 294-2, 494; Law No. 107 of 1997.
220 See Zadankai, Shdhh Kaisei to KikUo Keiei, Jitsumu no Arikata [Roundtable, Corporate
Management and Practice and Commercial Code Revision], 1479 Sii6ji H6MU 12, 23-24
(1998) (describing interest group sentiments). On changes in the nature of scandals
and the enforcement environment, see Hideaki Kubori, KaishaJiken no Shos6 to Hensen
[Changes and Various Aspects of Corporate Incidents], 1229 SI-16ji H6MU 43, 43 (1990) and
Sakuo Namba, H6kanky5 no Henka to Kigy6 Hmu [Changes in the Legal Environment and
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d. 1999-Present. Two issues dominated the end of the millennium:
mergers and corporate spin-offs. The timing of each was largely the
product of a political concession to big business. In early 1999, thenPrime Minister Keizo Obuchi formed the Industrial Competitiveness
Council, a group modeled after Ronald Reagan's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness and composed of cabinet ministers and industry leaders, including the presidents of Keidanren, Sony, Toyota,
and Asahi Beer.2 2 ' The Council, with a direct line to policymakers, was
able to shorten greatly the time normally taken for deliberation by the
Commercial Code Subcommittee.
Although the timing and policymaking process changed, the impetus for change differed little: Japanese companies needed to restructure largely in response to external competition. As for mergers,
in an increasingly international climate, Japan's firms, despite being
quite profitable, are actually relatively small. One roadblock to mergers has been the lack of a share exchange system, which ensured that a
single hold-out shareholder could prevent one firm from making another its wholly-owned subsidiary. In 1999, the Diet passed a plan allowing compulsory share exchange if endorsed by a two-thirds majority of shares represented at a shareholders' meeting, along with
provisions requiring parent companies to disclose subsidiary information, have subsidiaries examined by auditors, and give appraisal rights
to dissenters. 22
Second, Japanese corporate law historically contains no provisions
regarding corporate spin-off, in which a corporation divides itself into
two or more independent companies. Although similar effects can be
had with asset purchase transactions, the absence of such provisions
(with favorable tax consequences) is said to be a major roadblock to
companies attempting to restructure. The lack of spin-off provisions
became a pressing issue in the late 1990s, as Japan attempted broad
deregulation in the midst of a stagnating economy and foreign capital
influx. The Diet, following the recommendation of the Industrial
Competitiveness Council, approved spin-off revisions to the Code in

the Practice of CorporateLaw], 1514 SHOJI H6MU 72, 72 (1999).
221 See Naikaku S6ri Daijin [Prime Minister], Sangy6 Ky6s6ryoku
Kaigi no Kaisai ni
Tsuite [Regarding the Formation of the Industrial Competitiveness Council], Mar. 19, 1999,
available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sangyo/990421kesai.html;
Kaoru
Morishita, Elite Council to Tackle Supply-Side Issues, NIKKEI WKLY., Mar. 15, 1999, at 3 (describing the objectives of the council and the supply-side tactics it is anticipated to recommend).
222 Law No. 125 of 1999.
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May 2000.223
Reforms continue in the twenty-first century, spurred on in part by
the broader reforms proposed by the popular Koizumi cabinet. The
Commercial Code historically has allowed treasury shares only for the
purpose of retiring shares or, post-1997, for stock options. In June
2001, in response to the same sorts of pressures that led to the 1999
revisions, the Diet revised the Code to allow companies to hold treas224
ury shares for virtually any purpose and any length of time , and to
units.
ease rules on minimum trading
One final issue, which arose in spring 2000, is still under debate.
In the name of "globalization" and "international competition, 2' 6 the
Ministry ofJustice announced plans to overhaul completely the company law provisions of the Commercial Code by 2002. The ambitious
overhaul, which is said to be the most comprehensive since 1950 and
is part of a broader trend of legal reform, will primarily address corporate governance issues such as control, accountability, and
strengthening of boards through the introduction of outsiders, but
will also attempt to modernize the language of the Code, which still
retains much of its 1899 literary flavor. 221
223

Law No. 90 of 2000; see Diet Passes Bills to Promote Corporate Reorganizations,

NIKKEI WKLY., May 29, 2000, at 4 (describing the revised law and the benefits it is expected to bring companies).
224 Law No. 80 of 2001 (effective Oct. 1, 2001). The bill was submitted not by the
Ministry of Justice, but by individual Diet members. Although this process allows for
greater speed, one commentator notes that the lack of administrative commentary that
normally accompanies Ministry-formulated bills greatly hinders legal practice. Sh6h6
Kaisei to Giin Ripp6 [Commercial Code Revision and Legislator-IntroducedLegislation], 720
NEW Bus. L. 86 (2001).
225 A related bill authorizing the issuance of stock options
to third parties was
submitted by the Cabinet to the Diet in October 2001. See Henshiibu, Sh6h6t6no
Ichibu wo Kaisei sura H6ritsuan t6 no kokkai Teishutsu [Law to Revise Commercial
Code Submitted to Diet], 1608 SHoJi H6Mu 4 (2001). The bill also authorizes the
conducting of shareholders' meetings on the Internet.
226 On the role of these forces, see, for example, Hideki
Kanda, Kaishah6 Kaisei no
Kokusaiteki Haikei [ The InternationalBackground of the Company Law Revision], 1574 SH6JI
H6MU 11 (2000); Zadankai, Kaishah6Daikaisei no Igi [Roundtable, The Significance of the
Large-Scale Company Law Reform], 1206 JURISUTo 6, 8 (2001); and H6musho, 2nengo
medo, Kaishah6 Seido Kokusai Kjun ni-Sh6h6, 50nen buri Bappon Kaisei [Ministy of Finance Plans to Bring Corporate System up to InternationalStandard in Two Years: Most Dramatic Reform of Commercial Code in Fifty
Years], NIHON KEIzAI SHINBUN, Apr. 12, 2000, at
1.
227 For a report on the anticipated revisions of the Commercial
Code released in
April 2001, see Shth6 t6 no Ichibu o Kaisei suru H6ritsu Y6k5 Chdkan Shian [Outline of Interim Report of Revisions to the Commercial Code], available at http://www.moj.go.jp. A minor but nontrivial revision to the derivative suit system was passed in December 2001.
After a lengthy and contentious debate, policymakers agreed to allow corporations to
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D. Summary
The forgoing suggests that while Japanese developments before
1950 closely mimic those of Illinois and the MBCA, innovation after
1950 in Japan has been relatively slow and generally occurs in response to scandals, sudden events, or forces outside of Japan, which I
label as "exogenous" to the corporate legislative process. Table 4 lists
the major post-1950 corporate law changes and the apparent primary
motivation for each.

amend their articles of incorporation to limit the amount for which directors may be
liable in derivative suits. Representative directors' liability may be capped at an
amount equal to six years of compensation, inside directors' liability at four years of
compensation, and outside directors' liability at two years of compensation. See Kakoku
na Yakuin Baishd ni Hadome [Putting the Brakes on Arduous Executive Liability Payments],
NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, Dec. 5, 2001, at 3. The revisions came in response to the
Osaka District Court's finding in September 2000 of $775 million in liability for eleven
directors of Daiwa Bank, a huge amount by Japanese standards. Both sides appealed,
and in December 2001, the Osaka High Court approved a settlement of about $2 million for all forty-nine defendants. See 2oku 5000man en de Wakai [250 Million Yen Settlement], ASAHI SI-INBUN, Dec. 12, 2001, at 1.
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Table 4: Summary of MajorJapanese
Corporate Law Developments
Year

Change

Primary Motivations
Backlash

1962
1966
1974
1981

Reversal of 1950 policies (preemptive
rights)
Piecemeal accounting changes
Loosening of share transfer restrictions
Strengthening of auditors
Strengthening of shareholder monitoring

1993

Strengthening derivative suit mechanism

U.S. pressure, foreign
investor demands

1994

Limited allowance of share repurchases

Stock market crash

1955

1997

Allowance of issuance of stock options to
197 employees

Securities Act reform
Globalization
Scandal
Scandal/globalization

Foreign competition,
foreign investor
demands
Foreign competition
Scandal

1997
1997

Simplification of mergers
Increased sokaiya penalties

1999

Mergers

Foreign competition,
economic downturn

2000

Spin-offs

2001

Treasury stock

2002?

Overhaul: governance, syntax

Foreign competition,
economic downturn
Foreign competition,
economic downturn
Globalization, international competition, and
foreign investors

The data suggest three points. The first point is not that Japanese
corporate law does not change. As the above chart suggests, clearly it
does. The point is that the types of changes undertaken in the Japanese system are different from the changes seen in the U.S. system despite the convergence forces of international competition. Just as Japan has adopted few MBCA solutions, several of the specific reforms
listed above, such as sokaiya penalties, do not have direct analogues in
the U.S. system, or at least did not occur contemporaneously with
Japanese revisions.
Second, in each of the reforms listed above, corporate law development proceeded not in accordance with a broad plan, either of
government, managers, investors, or any other interest group. Nor
did it follow a model of rapid change toward efficient evolution. Instead, development in Japan is best described as slow and reactionary
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to various exogenous phenomena. Because changes drafted solely in
response to exogenous stimuli differ from other changes, this systemic
characteristic helps explain why differences in corporate law development persist despite a common starting point.
Third, the data do not necessarily indicate that international

competition will lead to convergence, even in the long run. Note that
of the seven revisions enacted in 1997 or later, five respond to international competition issues, a shift related both to the increasingly
global economy and the increased role of industry in the Japanese
corporate law revision process."" Noting this trend, proponents of the
convergence thesis might argue that this Article is premature. If I
wouldjust wait another fifty years or so, they might argue, this international competition would lead to convergence.
Maybe so. I have little doubt that limited convergence may occur,
especially if the recent pace of reforms continue. But the available
evidence suggests that complete convergence in the near future is unlikely, for three reasons. First, although Japan's institutional and social structure differed from that of the United States in 1950, its corporate law began in the same place and nevertheless diverged.
Starting the convergence process in 2002, in which the legislative systems are not in the same place as they were in 1950, might be even
less likely to lead to convergence, at least in the absence of massive
and perhaps comparatively more difficult changes to background institutional and social structures (which may indeed come). Second,
although global competition has increased in recent years, the evidence suggests that fifty years ofJapanese interaction and competition
with the United States have not led to statutory convergence. Finally,
because Japan's corporate law system appears to respond only to exogenous shocks such as international competition, convergence may
come on some limited issues, but more systemic convergence that follows from other sorts of forces, as in the United States, appears unlikely.
IV. WHY EXOGENOUS SHOCKS?

The previous Part described Japan's reliance on exogenous shocks
as a possible explanation for differing patterns of corporate law development between Japan and the United States. But what accounts for
the greater influence of exogenous shocks in Japan? Given that the
See Iwahara, supra note 211, at 5, 6 (noting an increased role of industry in the
"Americanization" ofJapanese corporate law).
228
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economic activity levels and corporate legal structures are relatively

similar in both countries, one obvious place to look for differences is
in institutional structures.
A.

JurisdictionalCompetition

The merits of regulatory arbitrage, the ability of jurisdictions to
compete for corporate charters based on differing corporate laws,
have been well debated in the literature."' No such debate occurs in
Japan. Although Japan is administratively divided into prefectures,
only one system of incorporation and corporate rules exists, with
three primary results. First, inefficient arrangements in Japan are often exacerbated by the absence of regulatory competition.9 0 Second,
the development of corporate law in Japan, as in most systems outside
of the United States, proceeds unhampered by state interest groups,
companies, and general revenue recipients from incorporate service
l
2
corporation.
Third and more centrally, the lack of competition in Japan means
that the rate of change of corporate law often requires exogenous
shocks for change. In competitive jurisdictions, change proceeds with
relative speed, often led by rent-seeking endogenous actors. In the
United States, as the several states compete for franchise tax revenues,
led by corporate attorneys and interested managers, changes in one
jurisdiction are often rapidly copied in others.3 2 Examples in the lit229 See, e.g., Carney, PoliticalEconomy, supra note 27, at 318-27 (arguing
that lack of
competition for corporate charters can result in inefficient provisions and more restrictive rules); cf Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable
Limits on State Competition in CorporateLaw, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1437 (1992) (contending that "state competition is likely to fail with respect to certain important issues
that state corporate law has traditionally governed" and advocating "a substantial expansion of the role of federal law in shaping corporate law rules"); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalismand CorporateLaw: The Race to Protect Managersfrom
Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1168, 1170 (1999) (asserting that "competition among
states is ... likely to produce troubling results with respect to some critical aspects of
corporate law").
20 See Carney, PoliticalEconomy, supra note 27, at 329 (comparing American
and
European corporate law and concluding that the presence of jurisdictional competition in the American system has led to less regulation and greater mobility and choices
for corporations in the United States).
231 To incorporate, incorporators must pay a registration fee
of 0.7% of capital,
with a minimum fee of Y150,000 (about $1,200). Toroku Menkyo Zeih6 [Registration and
Licensing Tax], outlined in 2002 MOHAN RoPP6 [MODEL CODE] 3029, 3030 (Haneri
Rop?6 Henshfi Iinkai ed., 2001).
32 See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Evolution and Spontaneous
Uniformity: Evidence from the Evolution of the Limited Liability Company, 34 ECON. INQUIRY
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erature abound. Delaware's major 1967 revision was undertaken in
direct response to state competition,2" and its 1988 adoption of an
anti-takeover statute came in response to both state competition and
attempted takeovers of Delaware corporations. 3 ' Illinois responded
similarly to state competition in the early 1980s and the subsequent
takeover boom, as seen in Figure 2, above.23 5 Occasionally exogenous
shocks matter in the United States as well, especially in response to
what drafters regard as misguided judicial decisions, such as Delaware's legislative limitation of director liability in the aftermath of
Smith v. Van Gorkom.236 But the predominant force is competitionfostered endogenous pressure.
By contrast, in internally noncompetitive systems such as Japan,
because relatively few endogenous incentives exist, policy is more
heavily determined by exogenous events. In Japan, exogenous forces
such as foreign pressure, domestic scandal, and global competition
are almost always necessary to induce change. Although an endogenous political economy story can still be told, endogenous actors often
have fewer incentives to push for change in a unitary system, relying
instead on exogenous shocks to jump-start the process.
In such noncompetitive systems, finding the appropriate response
to exogenous shocks may take precedence over careful examination
of institutional complementarities and substitutes. Competitive system reformers, precisely because of competitive concerns, attempt to

464, 465 (1996) (analyzing the causes of uniformity of state statutory provisions relating to limited liability companies).
See S. Samuel Arsht, A Histoiy of Delaware CorporationLaw, I DEL.
J. CORP. L. 1,
14-15 (1976) (discussing the objectives of the 1967 Delaware Corporation Law Revision
Committee); Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware CorporationLaw of 1967,
117 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 862 (1969) ("Delaware from time to time redesigns and improves its product to keep ahead of the competition.").
234 See, e.g., Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market
for Corporate Charters: History and
Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 905 (1990) ("Almost immediately after the Supreme
Court decision in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., in April 1987, upholding Indiana's second generation takeover statute, the council of the Corporate Law Section began considering recommending a similar statute to the General Assembly.").
235 See ThomasJ. Bamonte, The Meaning of the "CorporateConstituency"
Provision of the
Illinois Business CorporationAct, 27 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 1 (1995) (noting that Illinois
adopted its "corporate constituency" provision in response to corporate takeover activity). 236 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991) (permitting a certificate of incorporation, under certain circumstances, to eliminate or
limit the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for
monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty). For a similar case in Japan, see the
Daiwa Bank derivative suit discussed supranote 227.
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create laws that are consistent with existing structures in a deliberative
process over time. But noncompetitive system reformers may be more
focused on finding solutions to shocks, leaving untouched areas that
might be prime candidates for legal reform in competitive systems. In
noncompetitive systems, only those areas of corporate law directly implicated by exogenous shocks are likely to be reformed.
One lesson suggested here is that among the potentially infinite
range of factors that leads to differing patterns of legal development
(including, for instance, business and political institutions and behavioral norms), differing degrees of competition in corporate law systems may play an important role. Along the continuum of competition, Japan's unitary jurisdiction (on an island, no less) may be at the
extreme of noncompetition, 3 s and the United States federal system
may be at the other extreme. Somewhere in between lies the European system-currently in the midst of debate between the real seat
rule, which states that the corporate law of the corporation's principal
place of business governs, and the recent Centros decision by the
European Court ofJustice, z0 which allows limited forum shopping for
newly formed corporations. 240 The continuum suggests that the lesser
the degree of competition, the greater the chances that corporate law
changes will be responsive primarily to outside stimuli. Differing degrees of competition thus may help explain not only rates24of change,
law.
but also persistent substantive divergence in corporate
237 Even wide-scale reforms such as those undertaken in
1981 often are rooted in
rather small responses to external phenomena. University of Tokyo Professor Hideki
Kanda recently noted (in a symposium on corporate law reform) that foreign investment trusts operating in Japan may be disadvantaged by the Commercial Code provision requiring notice for shareholders' meetings to be sent fourteen days in advance of
the meeting. Hitoshi Maeda et al., Kongo no Kaishah6 Kaisei ni Kansuru Kihonteki na
Shiten [Basic Views on the Next Company Law Reform], 1548 SH6JI H6Mu 8, 19 (2000)
(statement of Hideki Kanda); see also SH6H6, art. 232 ("In convening a general meeting, notice shall be sent to each shareholder at least two weeks prior to the day set for
such meeting."). But as Kanda noted, changing the requirement to at least one
month's notice might cascade into a large-scale Code reform, as provisions regarding
record dates and dividends would have to be drastically altered.
238 South Korean corporate law development has followed a similar
pattern. See
Joongi Kim, Recent Amendments to the Korean Commercial Code and Their Effects on International Competition, 21 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 273, 278 (2000) (explaining how Korean
corporate structure has hindered the competitiveness of that nation's industry).
239 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen,
1999 E.C.R.
1-1484, 2000 CEC (CCH) 290 (1999).
240 See GILSON, supra note 18, at 27-33 (discussing how
the European Court ofJustice chose to protect forum shopping by decoupling the decision of where to incorporate from the decision of where to physically locate the business).
241 The relationship between jurisdictional competition rules and substantive dif-
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B. OtherInstitutions: Policymakingand CapitalMarkets
In Japan, the difficulties of a noncompetitive chartering system
are exacerbated by other institutional constraints that restrict internal
change. For instance, the advisory committee, a creation of Occupation authorities, has clear analogues in the United States: standing
committees on corporate law. But the Japanese advisory committee
seems especially built for slowness and lack of innovation, as its
agenda is determined solely by the government, and its internal procedures are those of a sub-optimal private legislature, with no formal
endogenous mechanism for resolving debates.142 As such, it tends to
generate little internal change.
Nor do the Japanese courts encourage considerable change. Although recent decisions suggest a more active role for the judiciary in
corporate affairs, 243 the judiciary historically has not prompted the sort
of change often seen in the United States, a trend that may also be
based at least in part on a lack ofjurisdictional competition.244
The lack of serious input from attorneys, or indeed in many cases
from any private group other than business interests (or indirectly by
sokaiya), also engenders a reliance on exogenous forces. Most prominent by omission is the lack of a plaintiffs' bar in Japan.245 In the
United States, by contrast, a variety of actors contribute to the corporate lawmaking process, including judges, academics, and perhaps
most prominently, attorneys who serve on standing committees of a
state's bar. One result of the Japanese system is that changes are
ferences in corporate law is not new. See Carney, PoliticalEconomy, supra note 27, at
309-29 (concluding that the main reason American and European corporate law has
followed different paths is the early creation of a common market in the United
States). My approach merely proposes a precise explanation of the way in which such
rules might function and focuses the inquiry on jurisdictions in which the state completely monopolizes corporate law in a unitary system.
24
See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The PoliticalEconomy of PrivateLegislatures,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 648-52 (1995) (positing that when interest groups conflict, private legislatures will likely adopt vague rules or none at all).
243 See supra text accompanying notes 107-13; see
also CurtisJ. Milhaupt & Mark D.
West, Institutional Change and M&A in Japan: Diversity Through Deals, in GLOBAL
MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA

OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS (CurtisJ. Milhaupt ed., forthcoming) (noting the recent shift
in the balance of power from the bureaucracy to the Japanese courts in the context of
mergers and acquisitions).
44 See, e.g., Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy
in Corporate
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1927-35 (1998) (analyzing how legal indeterminacy as a
competitive feature unique to Delaware's corporate law jurisdiction leads to a greater
role for Delaware's judiciary).
245 See supra text accompanying
note 124-25.
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largely driven by politicians, bureaucrats, and business leaders, with
other parties having relatively less input through the advisory committee system. 246 This institutional arrangement tends to generate a system of change that relies heavily on exogenous forces and less on internal competition.
Finally, perhaps the differing patterns of corporate law development in Japan and the United States can also be explained by the differing roles of capital markets in the two systems. Specifically, perhaps
there is relatively little pressure on corporate law in Japan because
such a large percentage of Japanese stock is in corporate hands. If
this is so, we might expect corporate law changes to come in response
only to severe shocks, and, without jurisdictional competition, those
247
shocks are likely to be exogenous.
On the other hand, the increase in reforms post-1990 may reflect
other political and economic factors. One easy explanation is that
exogenous events were simply more plentiful. Moreover, as the Industrial Competitiveness Council's creation suggests, 48 the increase in
corporate law changes may be a reflection not of increased individual
shareholdings, but of renewed corporate power. Foreign shareholding may also be a factor. Since 1950, the percentage of shares held by
non-Japanese shareholders has risen dramatically, especially since
1990. In 1990 non-Japanese entities held 4.2% of Japanese shares, in
1995 they held 9.4%, and by 1998 they held over 10%.24) Although
non-Japanese shareholders are not necessarily active participants in
the Japanese policymaking process, the numbers at least suggest a

246

Normative conclusions do not necessarily follow from the lack of jurisdictional

competition in Japan. Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell argue that at least with
respect to takeover law, states have enacted rules that excessively protect incumbent
managers. Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 229, at 1173-90. If Bebchuk and Ferrell are
correct,Japan can at least proudly claim to have avoided this pitfall.
247 To test this conjecture, consider the percentage of Japanese individual
shareholdings over time. From 1950 to 1988, individual shareholdings steadily declined,
from 61.3% in 1950 to 39.9% in 1970, to 29.2% in 1980, and to 23% in 1988. After
1988, the percentage of individual shareholding rose slightly each year, from 23.6% in
1995 to 25.4% in 1998. TOKYo SH6KEN TORJHIKIJO, SH6KEN T6KEi NENP6 [SECURITY
STATISTICS YEARBOOK] (various years). Accordingly, there might be more pressure on
corporate law after 1988, and we might expect more corporate law changes after that
date. In fact, that is exactly the trend that occurred-as the previous Part shows, the
pace of corporate law revisions increased in the 1990s. The correlation between decreased corporate shareholding and increased corporate law changes might suggest
that corporate law is needed to replace capital markets arrangements.
248 Morishita, supra note 221 (discussing the role of the Industry Competitiveness
Council in revivingJapan's economic might).
249 ToKYo SH6KEN TORIHIKIJO, supra note 247.
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growing exogenous force that correlates with the increased number of
post-1990 corporate law changes.
In short, it is difficult to draw precise conclusions from capital
market trends. The correlation between the decline in corporate
shares and the increase in corporate law changes could be indicative
of increased reliance and need for corporate law, an increase in exogenous power from foreign shareholders, or some other force.
Given all the other evidence, I find the jurisdictional competition and
policymaking institutions to be the most powerful forces in determining the overall pattern of corporate law development, but capital markets and other institutions may play important supporting roles.
V. EXTENSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Beyond the unexpected finding of divergence, the story of corporate law development described in the preceding two Parts has three
implications for the comparative corporate law and governance debate. First, although substantial statutory convergence is unlikely, a
limited form of convergence in the form of increased common enabling rules may occur. Second, while convergence tends to occur rapidly, divergence appears to be a rather lengthy process. Third, without a thorough understanding of the institutional framework in which
corporate law functions, the efforts of modern foreign legal advisors,
like their counterparts in the 1950 Occupation, may not necessarily
lead to expected results.
A. Convergence and Divergence
Consider the results of this Article's empirical project in light of a
recent study by Katharina Pistor.250O Pistor undertook an empirical examination of corporate law statutes in twenty-four transition economies. She found a "high level of statutory legal convergence," which
she attributes largely to direct influence: a combination of "foreign
technical assistance programs as well as of harmonization require5
ments for countries wishing to join the European Union. 2'1
The convergence that Pistor observes is interesting in light of the Japanese experience. In Japan, the role of foreign legal assistance-in the form
of the Allied Occupation-certainly was important, and accounts for
*the 1950 convergence that we see among systems, including Japan.
250
251

Pistor, Patterns,supra note 28.
Id. at 2-3.
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But the harmonization requirements of the European Union suggest
the existence of strong external forces not seen in the decidedly unitary Japanese system, and may account for the differing results between Pistor's study and mine.
To examine ways in which my results may be compatible with Pistor's, I return to the statutory database. I begin with the assumption
that some corporate law provisions are more important than others.
Recall that the list of 569 total MBCA provisions has already been reduced by three-quarters to the 142 important provisions by Carney.
To classify the "most important" provisions of the 142 "important"
provisions, I assume that, in general, mandatory provisions may be
54
Accordmore central to code development than other provisions.
folrules,
enabling
and
rules
ingly, I divide the sample into mandatory
55
lowing MacKerron's typology.2
"Mandatory" does not necessarily mean "important" in all cases,
and accordingly more meaningful insights may result from the initial
investigation of the database of 142 provisions. But looking at the
mandatory/enabling division should at least provide the same sorts of
insights that Pistor gains from her use of the provisions initially used
by La Porta and others, 56 while avoiding the pitfalls of an arbitrary or
particularized assignation of weight. Figure 3 shows the relationship
of mandatory to enabling rules over the past fifty years for the three
comparable jurisdictions, as well as Delaware. As seen in the figure,
the percentage of mandatory corporate law provisions passed relative
to all corporate law provisions adopted has declined over time for
each of the fourjurisdictions.
A further factor may distinguish this Article from Pistor's work. The corporate
law variables that Pistor examines are primarily mandatory corporate law provisions
such as cumulative voting and preemptive rights provisions. Pistor, Patterns,supra note
28, at 10. This Article explores a much broader range of corporate law, encompassing
the entire scope of the MBCA.
253 See supra note 2 (identifying provisions in the MBCA adopted by the vast majority of the states to illustrate the trends toward uniform state laws in a competitive market).
254 On the importance of mandatory rules in public corporations, see Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461, 1485 (1989); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of CorporateLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1554
(1989).
255 Enabling rules encompass three of MacKerron's categories (pure enabling,
enabling/empowerment, and default opt-out), mandatory rules encompass two (pure
mandatory and mandatory constraints on enabling rules). The division effectively
separates true mandatory rules from rules that a corporation may ignore without legal
penalty. MacKerron, supra note 74, at 670-86.
256 Supra note 28.
22
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The relative increase in enabling rules might be attributable to
competition for corporate charters. States compete for corporate
charters by offering attractive corporate codes. Market forces will thus
ensure that efficient code provisions survive. Because mandatory provisions are increasingly seen as inefficient restrictions on freedom of
contract,25 7 it should not be surprising that an increasingly greater
percentage of enabling provisions are adopted and remain over time.
But such a jurisdictional competition argument would not explain
why Japan, where jurisdictional competition does not exist, has a percentage of enabling provisions equal to that of Delaware. A better explanation for the low percentage of mandatory provisions in Delaware
and Japan might be the ability of interest groups to influence regulators in those jurisdictions. In short, Delaware is different. In Delaware, as in Japan, business-related interest groups have been relatively
successful in reducing the percentage of provisions that require mandatory performance by corporations. Although Delaware is subject to
state competition like any other state, its status as the leading corporate jurisdiction might in some areas create pseudo-monopolistic
Because the MBCA has historiqualities similar to those of Japan.i
to serious interest group inflususceptible
less
cally been (arguably)
ence, it has a higher percentage of mandatory provisions. Illinois,
perhaps like all other non-Delaware states, is somewhere in between.
The general divergence in corporate law seen between Japan and
the United States might indicate that the corporate law demands of
corporations in Japan are not begin met to the same extent as in the
competitive system of the United States. But such a "frustrated corporate demand" theory is generally inapposite to the standard Japanese
political economy story, which assumes that business exerts a heavy
hand in revisions through such organizations as Keidanren and its political ties. Figure 3 is not inconsistent with the supposition thatJapanese corporations have been quite successful-indeed, over time,
more successful than Delaware corporations-in preventing the passage of new restrictive mandatory corporate law provisions relative to
257See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989) ("The corporation is a complex set of explicit and
implicit contracts, and corporate law enables participants to select the optimal arrangement... in a large economy. No one set of terms will be best for all; hence the
'enabling' structure of corporate law.").
258See Kamar, supra note 244, at 1954 ("Delaware utilizes its market power to enhance its competitive position ...by the indeterminate nature of its law ...secur[ing]
barriers to entry-such as network externalities, judicial advantage, and credible commitment-that protect Delaware.").
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enabling provisions. Within the context of corporate law divergence,
it may be that corporate demands are being met at a certain basic
level that reflects corporate influence.!)
The general increase in enabling provisions across jurisdictions
may have significant implications for convergence. I measured the
percentage for each five-year period since 1950 of common enabling
provisions relative to all common provisions.' 6 From 1950 to 2000,
the proportion of mandatory provisions as a percentage of common
provisions has fallen from about 47% to about 39%. This is a relatively small change, and any conclusions based on it are tentative at
best. That caveat stated, these data tentatively suggest that if a limited
form of "convergence" in the form of increased common provisions is
occurring, it is occurring not on "important" mandatory corporate
rules that are said to be a source of path dependence2 6' but on enabling
" 62
bling rules.
The increase in enabling rules might account for some variation in
corporate structure. Enabling rules may allow for greater diversity in
corporate structure to suit the needs of different industries, locations,
complementarities, regulatory schemes, and constituencies. Enabling
rules may thus encourage particularized solutions to individual problems, or multiple optimum solutions to common problems, which may
help explain why structural divergence may continue to occur despite
legal change.
The phenomenon observed in 1950 Japan, and again in 1990s
Eastern Europe, points to a second possible trend in convergence and
divergence of corporate systems. Had the period of comparison be-

259 Note,

however, that the lack ofjurisdictional competition also
leads to a multitude of inefficientJapanese corporate law provisions. SeeJ. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU
NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 110 (1999) ("Because [Japanese
corporate law] faces less [competitive] pressure, it retains-for all its basic appropriateness-a substantial variety of oddly inefficient minor rules."); see also Carney, Political Economy, supra note 27, at 304 ("[J]urisdictional competition within a federal system
plays a constructive role by inhibiting the rent-seeking activities of interest groups.").
260For an illustration of the number of common
provisions across jurisdictions,
see supra Figure 1.
261See Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 13,
at 138 (introducing the idea of rule-driven
path dependence).
262Saul Levmore has argued that divergence
among legal systems "often arises in
rules that either (a) do not matter or (b) raise issues about which reasonable people ...could disagree." Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the GoodFaith Purchaser,16J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 44 (1987). Perhaps in this case it could be said
that corporate lawmakers agree that adaptation is the central problem of organization,
but simply disagree on the details.
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tweenJapan and the United States been 1945-1950 and not 1950-2000,
we would have observed a tremendous convergence of corporate laws,
much like that seen in the 1990-1998 Eastern European experience.
Even the period 1995-2000 shows relatively more convergence than
the fifty-year period. Thus, a tentative conclusion is that while convergence tends to take place rapidly, divergence may be a phenomenon that tends to occur over lengthy periods of time. Although a
complete empirical elaboration of this idea in a broad cross-national
context is beyond the scope of this Article, this is not an unexpected
result-convergence may occur due to regulatory reasons such as
harmonization requirements, because of foreign technical assistance,
or because one system is identified as a superior model for mimicry.
These sorts of forces are likely to lead to rapid change. Divergence, by
contrast, is centered in differences in institutional and political structures, which may lead to less rapid change.
B. Foreign LegalAdvisors
In recent years, foreign legal advisors have played a significant
role in aiding corporate law reform in transition economies. From
Russia to South Korea and across Eastern Europe 2" 3 corporate law often has its substantive origins in the offices of U.S. universities and
agencies. As Pistor's study suggests, the influence of such foreign advisors may bring about broad statutory convergence across jurisdictions. 2 4
Although the postwar occupation of Japan obviously occurred under somewhat unique circumstances, the influence of foreign legal
advisors on that occasion parallels nicely with modern developments.
In 1950, as in more modern reform efforts, foreign advisors were confronted with an antiquated system that paid little attention to minority
shareholders. In 1950, as in many developing economies today, foreign advisors recommended and established a slightly modified version of the American system.
The Japanese experience suggests that corporate legal reform may

2, 3

See, e.g., Gainan Avilov et al., General Principles of Company Law for Transition

Economies, 24 J. CORP. L. 190 (1999) (setting out policy guidelines for transitional
economies); Black & Kraakman, supra note 11 (basing an analysis of corporate law on a
case study of Russian corporate law, which was developed with the aid of American
professors); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Privatizationand Corporate Governance in a Unified Korea,

26J. CORP. L. 199 (2001) (providing a guide for privatization of North Korean stateowned enterprises).
264Pistor, Patterns,supra note 28.
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not necessarily proceed as path dependence logic might predict. After the task of foreign advisors was completed in 1950, future generations ofJapanese reformers were guided not by overarching efficiency
concerns, but by exogenous system shocks. Areas of corporate law not
directly affected by specific shocks were not revised.
Amy Chua cautions that "Western lawyers involved in the developing world" should not overlook entrenched ethnic divisions in the
processes of marketization and democratization . 265s The data pre
sented in this Article suggest a similar normative claim even in the absence of such ethnic divisions: corporate law reform should proceed
with a detailed knowledge of institutional dynamics, particularly of the
competitive nature of the system. This is not to suggest thatJapan has
gone wrong-either because of or despite its corporate law, the Japanese economy in the long run has been a success. The point is that
even in the absence of backlash, legal advisors should note that the results of their statutory tinkering may not necessarily be what some
theory might predict. If change by endogenous means is desired, advisors should consider implementing jurisdictional competition institutions or other devices to encourage legal change.
Of course, such institutional tinkering is easier said than done.
The relatively simple establishment of competing corporate chartering systems is unlikely to be a complete solution. In fact, without the
simultaneous creation of complementary institutions such as franchise-tax incentives and separate bodies of corporate law on which
states or other political divisions can compete, such a system standing
alone may only result in increased transaction costs.1 66 The point is
simply that advisors should not expect corporate law reforms to have
the same effect in differing systems.
CONCLUSION

The use of Illinois corporate law as a precedent for both the

25 Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity:
Toward a New Paradigmfor Law
and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (1998) ("Proponents of marketization and democratization must start confronting these questions, however awkward or unsettling.").
266 See Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey
G. MacIntosh, The Role of Interjurisdictional
Competition in Shaping Canadian Corporate Law, 20 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 141, 158
(2000) (arguing that one reason legislatures may pursue uniformity in provincial corporate law is the possibility of lowering transaction costs); see also Timothy W. Guinnane, A Failed Institutional Transplant: Raiffeisen's Credit Cooperatives in Ireland, 18941914, 31 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 38, 49-58 (1994) (noting the difficulty of institutional transplants in light of institutional complementarities).
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Model Business Corporation Act and the Japanese Commercial Code
provides an interesting baseline from which to compare corporate law
systems and their development over time. The divergence of those
statutes-despite a "separated-at-birth" common beginning and frequent subsequent interaction-presents a bit of a puzzle. In this Article, I have suggested that one possible explanation for the divergence
may lie in the reliance on exogenous stimuli to spark corporate law
change in Japan. The reliance on exogenous shocks to determine the
direction and substance of reform leads Japanese law down a path different from U.S. law. Shock provokes revisions, and no shock means
no revision. I have posited that one possible explanation for this reliance in Japan, among a myriad of economic, social, and other factors
that affect legal development, is institutional; reliance on shocks is
primarily due to institutions that eliminate jurisdictional competition,
but also to those that limit lawyer participation in the Japanese decision-making process.
In his study of legal transplants, Alan Watson states that "A successful legal transplant-like that of a human organ-will grow in its
new body, and become part of that body just as the rule or institution
would have continued to develop in its parent system. Subsequent development in the host system should not be confused with rejection. '' The Japanese corporate law experience tends to confirm
what comparative law experts like Watson might have suspected all
along: once transplanted, the organ was not rejected; rather, it took
on a life of its own. Modern foreign legal advisors aiding developing
systems would do well to note the potentially transient nature of convergence even in the face of evolution-toward-efficiency theory and
globalization pressures.

267 WATSON,

supra note 23, at 27.
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